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Abstract
Rutherfurd, Robert, M.A., Fall 2015

History

Cases of Conscience: The Supreme Court and Conscientious Objectors to Military
Service during the Post World War II Era
Chairperson: Michael S. Mayer
This thesis examines the history of American conscientious objectors to military service
during the aftermath of World War II. It describes why conscientious objectors were
viewed with distrust and suspicion for their refusal to bear arms in defense of the nation
and considers how groups such as the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign
Wars attempted to prevent COs from enjoying key benefits of U.S. citizenship by
demanding that conscientious objectors be excluded from public employment and denied
most forms of government assistance. This thesis focuses on decisions of the United
States Supreme Court following World War II that defined and extended the rights of
conscientious objectors. Some of those decisions reflected and continued a debate over
the protection of speech and claims of conscience that developed among the Justices on
the Supreme Court following the end of World War I. This paper explores and evaluates
the connections between the World War I era cases and decisions that followed the end of
World War II. Analysis of the post World War II decisions reveals how the Supreme
Court moved away from ideological debates over the protection of conscience towards
the imposition of procedural rules designed to insure that administrative and judicial
hearings involving COs met due process standards. The contests over the rights of
conscientious objectors that followed the end of World War II displayed the expanding
role the Supreme Court assumed in protecting the civil liberties of all Americans. The
Supreme Court cases concerning conscientious objectors discussed here also showed how
judicial protection of claims of conscience were influenced by Cold War fears that the
philosophy of COs might undermine the ability of the nation to defend itself.
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Introduction:
Is Encouraging Someone to follow his or her Conscience a Crime?
On September 10, 1948, Charles Ray Rickert, a Mennonite divinity student at
Bluffton College, went to the Selective Service office in Toledo, Ohio. He told the draft
board members that he was conscientiously opposed to military service and therefore
would not register for the draft as required by the Selective Service Act of 1948. A board
member spoke to Rickert and tried to change his mind. Rickert refused to capitulate and
left the office. On November 8, 1948, FBI agents arrived at Bluffton College to arrest
Rickert for failing to register. The college’s dean of men, Larry Gara, a Quaker who had
served three years in prison during World War II for opposing the draft, accompanied the
FBI agents to Rickert’s dorm room, where, in the presence of the agents, Gara
encouraged Rickert to follow his conscience and not allow anyone to coerce him into
changing his mind. After the FBI agents took Rickert away, Gara and his wife wrote to
the Toledo district attorney expressing their opposition to the draft and their support for
young men like Rickert who refused to register. Mailed the same day the FBI arrested
Rickert, the letter said:
We have just learned of the arrest of Charles Rickert, a student at Bluffton
College who, as a conscientious objector to war and conscription has
refused to register for the draft. We have been very much concerned about
the imprisonment of young war objectors. It especially concerns us since
we would also refuse to register for the draft if we were asked to do so.
We have openly urged young men to take this position and shall do all in
our power to further the cause of civil disobedience to conscription in this
country. If men like Charles are guilty then we, too, are guilty for we have
advocated disobedience to the law and have supported men who take this
position.1
1	
  Gara

v. United States, 178 Federal 2d. 38 (1949)., aff'd. 340 United States 857 (1950). The Garas sent
similar letters to the Attorney General of the United States and to the District Attorney in Chicago. Gara
also signed a pledge in 1948 agreeing to “in every way possible assist and support Non-registrants.”
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Two months later, federal agents arrested Larry Gara and prosecuted him for
“counseling, aiding and abetting” the violation of the Selective Service Act of 1948. The
Toledo Federal District Court convicted Gara, and the judge sentenced him to eighteen
months in jail—the same prison term imposed on Rickert. The Federal Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court both subsequently upheld his
conviction.2 The theologically liberal Protestant magazine Christian Century
summarized the concerns of pacifists, conscientious objectors, and their supporters about
the Gara case and its outcome by asking, “Does the decision, made in Toledo, mean that
such advice to follow one's conscientious conviction is now a crime in the United
States?”3
The arrest and prosecution of Larry Gara and the outcry those events engendered
illuminated a fundamental conflict in American society and government—the struggle
between the rights of individual conscience and the power and authority of the
government. Two questions encapsulated the controversy: When and to what extent
could the government force individuals to act in a manner contrary to their consciences in
order to further the needs or protection of the state? And, when could the government
prohibit and punish the expression of ideas or beliefs that challenged the power or
policies of the state? Claims of conscience struck at the core of American democracy by
suggesting that because of their moral beliefs some individuals might openly disobey
laws enacted by the democratic majority. One had to look no further than the United
States Constitution and its protections against government encroachment on the freedoms
2	
  Ibid.	
  

3	
  "Prison	
  Sentence	
  to	
  Adviser	
  of	
  C.O.,"	
  Christian	
  Century	
  66	
  (1949):	
  645.	
  

2

of speech and religion to find the source of this controversy. Unless those rights of the
individual were interpreted either as meaningless and subject to government
encroachment, or, as absolute and never subject to infringement or curtailment despite the
danger ideas and their expression might pose to the country or its citizens, a balance had
to be struck between the rights of conscience and the authority of the nation to maintain
order and defend itself. Since the end of World War I, members of the United States
Supreme Court have debated how and where to mark the boundaries between claims of
conscience and state power, frequently in cases involving opposition to war and military
conscription. Defining those boundaries proved to be a difficult, contentious task, one
requiring constant reappraisal and adjustment, and though the military draft ended over
forty years ago, the effort to strike a balance between conscience and the state continues
today over other issues such as same-sex marriage and mandatory medical insurance
coverage for contraceptive services.4 The Gara case and the experiences of conscientious
objectors following World War II took place in the context of that continuing struggle to
define the boundaries between government power and the rights of conscience.
This thesis explores the protection of conscience from the perspective of
conscientious objectors, their supporters, and their opponents during the post World War
II era by considering the status of COs in American society at that time and by analyzing
relevant judicial decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Conscientious objectors
4	
  Proponents	
  of	
  same-‐sex	
  marriage	
  have	
  sued	
  certain	
  business	
  owners,	
  including	
  bakers	
  and	
  
photographers,	
  for	
  refusing	
  to	
  provide	
  their	
  services	
  to	
  same-‐sex	
  couples.	
  	
  The	
  business	
  owners	
  
contend	
  that	
  forcing	
  them	
  to	
  participate	
  in	
  same-‐sex	
  weddings	
  would	
  violate	
  their	
  religious	
  
principles.	
  	
  Robert	
  Barnes,	
  "Supreme	
  Court	
  Declines	
  Case	
  of	
  Photographer	
  Who	
  Denied	
  Service	
  to	
  Gay	
  
Couple,"	
  Washington	
  Post,	
  April	
  7,	
  2014.	
  In	
  another	
  recent	
  case,	
  the	
  owners	
  of	
  a	
  privately-‐owned	
  
family	
  business	
  sued	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  government.	
  	
  The	
  owners	
  of	
  the	
  business	
  argued	
  that	
  the	
  
Affordable	
  Health	
  Care	
  Act	
  violated	
  their	
  religious	
  freedom	
  by	
  forcing	
  them	
  to	
  provide	
  their	
  female	
  
employees	
  with	
  access	
  to	
  contraceptive	
  services	
  like	
  the	
  morning-‐after	
  pill.	
  See	
  Barwell	
  v.	
  Hobby	
  
Lobby,	
  573	
  United	
  States	
  ____	
  (2014).	
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often found themselves distrusted and ostracized for their refusal to bear arms. At the
same time, the Supreme Court continued a slow and sometimes inconsistent march
towards affording greater judicial oversight and protection for claims of conscience.
Embedded within the controversy over the ideology of conscientious objectors and
pacifists was a fundamental issue about the way in which Americans defined and
contested the privileges and obligations of U. S. citizenship during the post World War II
era.5 The debate focused on the obligations and benefits of citizenship. Were individuals
who refused to fight in defense of the nation entitled to the increasing rewards and
opportunities provided by American society? Were individuals who placed obedience to
their conscience above duty to their country true Americans? Those questions drove the
debate over the rights and treatment of conscientious objectors.
Reviewing the cases dealing with pacifists and COs shows that the Supreme Court
spoke hesitantly and at times inconsistently on the issue of conscience during the post
World War II era. Some decisions voiced strong support for conscience while others
reflected the distrust and fear of COs that permeated much of society. Though an
ideological debate initiated thirty years earlier by Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and
Louis D. Brandeis over the reasons claims of conscience should be tolerated continued,
no durable consensus emerged as to why and how the Court should draw the line between
5	
  The	
  historiography	
  of	
  conscientious	
  objection	
  and	
  peace	
  studies	
  includes	
  no	
  standard	
  definitions	
  

distinguishing	
  a	
  conscientious	
  objector	
  from	
  a	
  pacifist.	
  	
  The	
  term	
  “conscientious	
  objector”	
  is	
  often	
  
used	
  to	
  identify	
  those	
  individuals	
  whose	
  religious	
  or	
  moral	
  beliefs	
  require	
  that	
  they	
  refuse	
  to	
  
participate	
  in	
  military	
  service.	
  	
  The	
  term	
  is	
  frequently	
  associated	
  with	
  formal	
  procedures	
  provided	
  by	
  
the	
  United	
  States	
  government	
  for	
  individuals	
  to	
  secure	
  recognition	
  as	
  conscientious	
  objectors	
  and	
  
thereby	
  secure	
  exemption	
  from	
  military	
  conscription.	
  	
  Since	
  they	
  generally	
  object	
  to	
  all	
  wars,	
  
pacifists	
  are	
  often	
  referred	
  to	
  as	
  conscientious	
  objectors,	
  whether	
  or	
  not	
  they	
  have	
  sought	
  formal	
  
exemption	
  from	
  the	
  draft.	
  But	
  since	
  they	
  may	
  oppose	
  only	
  specific	
  wars	
  or	
  conflicts,	
  not	
  all	
  
conscientious	
  objectors	
  are	
  pacifists.	
  In	
  this	
  paper,	
  I	
  use	
  the	
  term	
  “conscientious	
  objector”	
  in	
  its	
  
broadest	
  sense,	
  using	
  it	
  to	
  designate	
  all	
  forms	
  of	
  opposition	
  to	
  military	
  service	
  and	
  conscription,	
  
whether	
  those	
  objections	
  emanate	
  from	
  religious	
  or	
  moral	
  beliefs	
  and	
  whether	
  those	
  objections	
  
prohibit	
  participation	
  in	
  all	
  wars	
  or	
  only	
  in	
  specific	
  conflicts.	
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the sanctity of personal beliefs and opinions on the one hand and the right of the
government to maintain order and defend itself on the other. The Court did, however,
eventually expand, rather than diminish, its role in safeguarding claims of conscience by
strictly enforcing procedural rules governing the classification and treatment of COs.
Chapter one of this thesis examines the status of conscientious objectors in
American society at the end of World War II. Few in number, unpopular, and united
only by their common opposition to war, they constituted a group that Justice Harlan
Stone referred to as a “discrete and insular minority.”6 They often found themselves the
targets of actions by the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars,
organizations that sought to exclude COs from public employment and other benefits and
protections of U.S. citizenship. Chapter one shows why conscientious objectors,
possessing little or no political power, were forced to look to the courts for vindication of
their rights.
Chapter two steps back and examines the competing rationales for the protection
of conscience that emerged from the post World War I cases involving free speech and
opposition to conscription. The beginning of the Court’s earnest concern for minority
views and claims of conscience lay in the free speech and draft opposition cases that
arose from World War I. Those cases showed that different views arose on the Court with
respect to how and why the expression of ideas and maintenance of beliefs should be
protected. Justice Holmes viewed the unfettered exchange of ideas as a means of
advancing state power and legitimacy, while Justice Louis D. Brandeis focused on the
importance of speech and conscience to the individual and to the fulfillment of the

6	
  United	
  States	
  v.	
  Carolene	
  Products	
  Co.,	
  304	
  United	
  States	
  144	
  (1938).	
  Footnote	
  4.	
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privileges and immunities guaranteed all American citizens by the Constitution of the
United States. These competing perspectives on why conscience deserved protection
continued to appear in post World War II cases as part of debates among the Supreme
Court Justices over the appropriateness of the Court scrutinizing any legislation
encroaching on the fundamental constitutional rights of U.S. citizens and over the amount
of deference the Court should exhibit towards Congressional and administrative decisions
pertaining to conscientious objectors.
Chapter three then considers how the post World War II decisions of the Supreme
Court regarding conscientious objection reflected and were influenced by the judicial
debates in the post World War I cases. The post World War II era cases involving COs
demonstrated how the Supreme Court extended its purview over claims of conscience by
eventually leaving behind the intellectual disputes over how and to what extent beliefs
and their expression should be protected and by focusing instead on enforcement of
technical details in the conscription process that protected the due process rights of
objectors. Most notably, proponents of the preferred freedoms doctrine, such as Justices
William O. Douglas and Hugo Black agreed with the champion of judicial restraint,
Justice Felix Frankfurter, on rules designed to safeguard the due process rights of COs in
administrative hearings before the Selective Service Board.7 The alliance yielded
procedural requirements that assured conscientious objectors of their right to discover
and address evidence concerning the legitimacy of their claims without requiring that the

7	
  The	
  preferred	
  freedoms	
  doctrine	
  held	
  that	
  the	
  Court	
  would	
  exercise	
  a	
  heightened	
  level	
  of	
  judicial	
  

scrutiny	
  when	
  reviewing	
  any	
  governmental	
  action	
  impinging	
  on	
  the	
  personal	
  freedoms	
  embodied	
  in	
  
the	
  Bill	
  of	
  Rights,	
  especially	
  those	
  rights	
  contained	
  in	
  the	
  First	
  Amendment.	
  C.	
  Herman	
  Pritchett,	
  Civil	
  
Liberties	
  and	
  the	
  Vinson	
  Court	
  (Chicago:	
  University	
  of	
  Chicago	
  Press,	
  1954),	
  33.	
  The	
  preferred	
  
freedoms	
  doctrine	
  is	
  discussed	
  in	
  Chapter	
  two.	
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justices reach an ideological consensus concerning why claims of conscience mattered
and which branch of the government should protect them.
Chapter four discusses one the most significant judicial victories achieved by
conscientious objectors during the post World War II era—the Court’s ruling in Girouard
v. United States (1946) that foreign CO’s were eligible to become U.S. citizens.8 The case
exhibited the continuing debate over the protection of individual liberty and conscience,
as well as the growing willingness of the Court to recognize claims of objectors. The
decision was hailed by COs and their supporters as a major victory for the protection of
conscience.
Finally, Chapter five returns to the Gara case and evaluates why it proved to be
such a bitter disappointment for conscientious objectors and their supporters and how it
related to the other decisions of that era concerning the protection of conscience and the
expression of unpopular beliefs. In contrast to Girouard, the result of the Gara
prosecution marked a step backwards for the protection of conscience.
This paper contributes to the historiography of civil liberties during the post
World War II period. Historians have noted the general trend of the Supreme Court in the
twentieth century to assume a greater role in the protection of civil liberties and in the
protection of minorities or other groups espousing unpopular ideas. That trend began in
the 1920’s when Justices Holmes and Brandeis invigorated the First Amendment
freedoms of speech and conscience.9 But the Court at times retreated from its expanded
role, and historians have characterized the years following World War II as some of the

8	
  Girouard	
  v.	
  United	
  States,	
  328	
  United	
  States	
  61	
  (1946).	
  
9	
  J.	
  Woodford	
  Howard	
  Jr.,	
  Mr.	
  Justice	
  Murphy:	
  A	
  Political	
  Biography	
  (Princeton:	
  Princeton	
  University	
  

Press,	
  1968),	
  231-‐34.	
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most restrictive in American history for civil liberties.10 This account generally is in
accord with those views, as it demonstrates how conscientious objectors and pacifists,
who remained objects of distrust and discrimination following the end of the War, found
only limited protection in the courts. The Gara case, for example, alarmed COs and their
supporters by suggesting that the a new assault against claims of conscience might be
underway. Other developments, however, proved more encouraging and suggested that
the march towards greater protection of conscience might continue over the long run.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Girouard v.United States (1946) stands out as a
significant victory for proponents of the protection of conscience.11 The Court also
expressed concern for the protection of conscience in post World War II cases by
insisting that hearings before the Selective Service Board concerning the draft status of
COs must at least comply with due process requirements. Those cases involving
conscientious objectors reflected how the Supreme Court expanded its role as the
protector of civil liberties by shifting its focus from ideological debates to procedural
details.12
This paper also builds on the work of other historians who have written on the
connection between military service and U.S. citizenship. In Warfare State, James T.
10	
  See	
  Paul	
  L.	
  Murphy,	
  The	
  Constitution	
  in	
  Crisis	
  Times,	
  1918-‐1969,	
  [1st	
  ed.].	
  ed.	
  (New	
  York:	
  New	
  York,	
  

Harper	
  &	
  Row,	
  1971),	
  280;	
  See	
  Geoffrey	
  R.	
  Stone,	
  Perilous	
  Times	
  :	
  Free	
  Speech	
  in	
  Wartime	
  from	
  the	
  
Sedition	
  Act	
  of	
  1798	
  to	
  the	
  War	
  on	
  Terrorism	
  (New	
  York:	
  W.W.	
  Norton	
  &	
  Co.,	
  2004).	
  See	
  also	
  
Woodford	
  Howard	
  Jr.,	
  Mr.	
  Justice	
  Murphy,	
  321.	
  
11	
  Girouard	
  v.	
  United	
  States.	
  328	
  United	
  States	
  61	
  (1946)	
  	
  
12	
  Historian	
  Mark	
  Tushnet	
  has	
  described	
  how	
  the	
  Warren	
  Court	
  exhibited	
  this	
  shift	
  in	
  focus	
  from	
  
ideology	
  to	
  procedural	
  details.	
  	
  According	
  to	
  Tushnet,	
  the	
  Warren	
  Court	
  displayed	
  more	
  concern	
  for	
  
the	
  result	
  in	
  a	
  given	
  case	
  than	
  it	
  did	
  for	
  developing	
  legal	
  doctrines	
  protecting	
  civil	
  liberties.	
  To	
  
accomplish	
  the	
  outcome	
  desired	
  by	
  the	
  Court,	
  the	
  justices	
  often	
  fashioned	
  detailed	
  procedural	
  rules	
  
limiting	
  state	
  action	
  that	
  interfered	
  with	
  constitutional	
  rights.	
  	
  The	
  extensive	
  procedures	
  governing	
  
police	
  interrogations	
  adopted	
  by	
  the	
  Court	
  in	
  Miranda	
  v.	
  Arizona	
  384	
  United	
  States	
  436	
  (1966)	
  
exemplified	
  this	
  new	
  approach	
  employed	
  by	
  the	
  Court	
  for	
  the	
  protection	
  of	
  individual	
  liberty.	
  	
  Mark	
  
Tushnet,	
  "The	
  Warren	
  Court	
  as	
  History,"	
  in	
  The	
  Warren	
  Court	
  in	
  Historical	
  and	
  Political	
  Perspective,	
  
ed.	
  Mark	
  Tushnet	
  (Charlottesville	
  and	
  London:	
  University	
  Press	
  of	
  Virginia,	
  1993),	
  10,	
  16,	
  22.	
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Sparrow examines how the benefits and security the United States government promised
its citizens—equal opportunity; job security; and the protection of civil liberties—were
linked to compulsory military service.13 Sparrow shows how American soldiers earned
those privileges of citizenship through their military service during World War II and
how the government adopted the GI Bill to fulfill the nation’s obligations to its
veterans.14 Margot Canady, on the other hand, looks at citizenship from the perspective
of gay men denied the benefits of the GI Bill because of their sexual preference. Those
men, argues Canaday, were denied recognition as American citizens despite having met
their obligation to serve in the armed forces.15 The history of conscientious objectors
adds another voice and additional perspective to this literature of contested citizenship.
While COs also were often denied the sense of financial security and protection other
Americans—especially those who fought in the War—expected and claimed as rightfully
theirs, they were excluded from those benefits of citizenship not because of immutable
characteristics—such as ethnicity or sexual orientation—but rather because they rejected
the premise that individuals could not follow their consciences and at the same time be
loyal citizens.
This thesis joins a large body of historical literature concerning conscientious
objectors and pacifists that has not thoroughly addressed and evaluated the experiences of
COs during the years immediately following World War II. By focusing on the debate
over the legal rights and status of conscientious objectors as citizens that occurred in
various public forums, especially in the courts, this study offers new perspectives on the
13	
  James	
  T.	
  Sparrow,	
  Warfare	
  State	
  :	
  World	
  War	
  II	
  Americans	
  and	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Big	
  Government	
  (Oxford	
  ;	
  

New	
  York:	
  Oxford	
  University	
  Press,	
  2011),	
  4,	
  44.	
  
14	
  Ibid.,	
  256.	
  
15	
  Margot	
  Canaday,	
  "Building	
  a	
  Straight	
  State:	
  Sexuality	
  and	
  Social	
  Citizenship	
  under	
  the	
  1944	
  G.I.	
  
Bill,"	
  The	
  Journal	
  of	
  American	
  History	
  90,	
  no.	
  3	
  (2003):	
  940.	
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extent to which American society tolerated and protected claims of conscience during an
era of increasing Cold War fears. Examining the struggles and status of COs in
American society as World War II ended and the Cold War began reveals what was at
stake in the political and judicial contests of that era, not just for conscientious objectors,
but for the civil liberties of all Americans.16

16	
  Examining	
  the	
  public	
  debate	
  over	
  conscientious	
  objection	
  also	
  adds	
  depth	
  and	
  complexity	
  to	
  

accounts	
  of	
  the	
  peace	
  movement	
  during	
  this	
  period.	
  	
  Historians	
  often	
  see	
  the	
  post	
  World	
  War	
  II	
  era	
  
as	
  one	
  of	
  retreat	
  for	
  peace	
  activists	
  due	
  to	
  Cold	
  War	
  anxiety.	
  See	
  Lawrence	
  S.	
  Wittner,	
  Rebels	
  Against	
  
War;	
  The	
  American	
  Peace	
  Movement,	
  1941-‐1960	
  (New	
  York,:	
  Columbia	
  University	
  Press,	
  1969).	
  See	
  
also	
  Scott	
  H.	
  Bennett,	
  Radical	
  Pacifism	
  :	
  The	
  War	
  Resisters	
  League	
  and	
  Gandhian	
  Nonviolence	
  in	
  
America,	
  1915-‐1963	
  (Syracuse:	
  Syracuse	
  University	
  Press,	
  2003).	
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Chapter 1
More Dangerous than Murderers and Traitors:
Conscientious Objectors in Post World War II America
As Gara sat in jail waiting for the Court of Appeals to hear his case (the trial
judge refused to release Gara on bail while his appeal was pending), Gara’s supporters
rallied to his aid. In July of 1949, four hundred clergymen from across the country,
including Reinhold Niebuhr, signed a letter to President Truman in which they defended
Gara’s actions and demanded his release.1 Members of prominent peace organizations,
such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the Women’s International League for
Peace and Freedom, picketed the White House in support of Gara.2 The Protestant
theologically liberal magazine Christian Century observed that the trial court had
convicted Gara for words of encouragement to Rickert, “words, such as any Christian
might utter to any man anywhere and at any time who was attempting to follow the
guidance of conscience.”3 From his pulpit at the Community Church of New York,
minister Donald Harrington condemned the prosecution of Gara and acknowledged
having himself counseled young men concerned about the draft to follow their
consciences wherever they led. If Gara was guilty, said Harrington, so was he.
Regarding Gara’s sentence, Harrington observed that, “Forgers are granted parole,
murderers and traitors are granted bail, but a pacifist like Larry Gara seems to be
regarded as more dangerous than them all.”4
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asserting that COs were treated more harshly than some dangerous criminals. According to the Central
Committee for Conscientious Objectors, COs Generally received longer sentences than other individuals
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Some Americans saw things differently, viewing Gara as a villain, not as a victim.
The New York Times condemned Harrington’s support of Gara, claiming that Gara and
Harrington were setting a dubious example. Laws, said the Times, expressed the
collective conscience of the people. Allowing everyone to choose which laws he intended
to follow and which ones he preferred to disobey would inevitably lead to chaos. In an
extreme case, a man might feel entitled to commit murder. The vast majority of
Americans, observed the Times, believed that maintaining military strength offered the
best way to preserve the peace. The Times editorial concluded with the hope that
Harrington “will mark a wiser course in the future” and stop supporting men who refused
to register.5 A weekly news magazine Time captured the frustration and anger
conscientious objectors could engender among their critics when a Truman
administration official asked to comment about the Gara case responded by saying,
“These conchies give you nothing but grief and trouble. They won't even apply for
parole—they just sit there in jail making martyrs of themselves and stirring up trouble."6
These conflicting views about Larry Gara and his actions mirrored a broader
debate that occurred in American society in the aftermath of World War II about the
status of conscientious objectors as citizens and the extent to which the government
should protect the expression of their ideas. The experiences of pacifists and
conscientious objectors like Larry Gara reflected the ways in which Americans defined
and contested the privileges and obligations of U. S. citizenship during the post World
convicted of crimes. The average CO sentence for refusing to comply with the Selective Service Act was
35.8 months, while the 1951 Annual Report for the Bureau of Prisons listed the average sentence for
forgery as 20.6 months, liquor law violations 10.5 months, narcotic violations 26.4 months, motor vehicle
theft 26.4 months, theft of other property 17.6 months. The average of all sentences was 20.5 months.
Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors, "Handbook for Conscientious Objectors," (1952), 43.
5	
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War II era. The debate focused on fundamental questions about the obligations and
benefits of citizenship: Were individuals who refused to fight in defense of the nation
entitled to the increasing rewards and opportunities provided by American society? Were
individuals who placed obedience to their conscience above duty to their country true
Americans? As the Cold War intensified, supporters and opponents of objectors and
pacifists clashed over the extent to which men who refused to bear arms in defense of the
nation were entitled to claim and enjoy the advantages and protections of U.S.
citizenship. They disagreed over whether conscientious objectors were brave men
adhering to their principles, or cowards who spread dangerous ideas against which the
country and its citizens must be protected. They argued over whether COs were qualified
to hold public jobs, over whether the president should restore the civil rights of objectors
convicted of violating the draft laws, and over whether foreigners opposed to military
service should be admitted as U.S. citizens. Supporters and critics of conscientious
objectors debated these issues in Congress, at school board meetings, at immigration
hearings, and eventually in the United States Supreme Court. The conflict pitted two of
the nation’s oldest and most fundamental values against each other: the duty of citizens to
defend the country by force, if necessary, in times of peril; and the freedom of conscience
embodied in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
This chapter recounts some of these events and debates that shaped the experience
of conscientious objectors following World War II. The Supreme Court issued the post
World War II decisions concerning COs amidst this controversy over the status of COs as
citizens. Examining the status of conscientious objectors in American society at that time
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helps explain the Court’s attempts to protect minority points of view without
undermining the nation’s ability to defend itself.
Conscientious objectors found themselves at a distinct disadvantage as they
sought to assert and protect their rights and privileges as American citizens following
World War II. COs were, in Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s telling phrase, a “discrete
and insular minority.”7 Few in number, they adhered to principles and ideals that
separated them from the rest of society. During World War II, 50 million men registered
for the draft, and 16 million men were inducted into the military. Historians estimate that
at most 50,000 men filed claims as conscientious objectors. Of those 50,000 objectors,
one-half (25,000) accepted non-combatant roles in the military, often serving as medics
or ambulance drivers. Another 12,000 objectors worked in the Civilian Public Service.8
Many of the remaining applicants were ruled exempt from service on other grounds;
excused because of family obligations or physical disability, their claims as conscientious
objectors were never formally resolved. The government prosecuted approximately
15,000 men during World War II for failing to comply with the Selective Service Act of
1940. Most of those men failed to register or to report for induction. About one-third of
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that group (5,800 men) refused to cooperate with the draft because they conscientiously
opposed military service. The rest tried to avoid serving for other reasons.9
Conscientious objectors lacked a cohesive philosophy and organizational structure
beyond their common opposition to military service. They adhered to markedly different
religious beliefs and practices. Conscientious objectors included members of the historic
peace churches, such as the Quakers, Mennonites, and Brethren, whose religious
convictions prohibited them from serving in the military. Some Protestants from
denominations outside of the traditional peace churches also claimed conscientious
objector status, as did some Roman Catholics. Seventh Day Adventists and Jehovah’s
Witnesses sought exemption from military service based on their religious beliefs as well.
Refusing to cooperate in any manner with the selective service system, Jehovah’s
Witnesses comprised many of the objectors in prison. Some objectors claimed no
religious affiliation, opposing conscription solely on moral or political grounds. A
number of these so-called “secular” objectors were also socialists. Many objectors were
pacifists who opposed all use of force. Whether their opposition to war was based on
religious teachings or on secular moral values, they saw violence, not fascism or
communism, as the central problem of the twentieth century.10
In contrast, the organizations, such as the American Legion and the Veterans of
Foreign Wars, who opposed conscientious objectors and contested their exercise and
enjoyment of the same rights and privileges as other Americans, were well organized and
powerful. The debate over the meaning of citizenship that occurred in the aftermath of
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World War II between conscientious objectors and their opponents demonstrated the
growing power and ability of special interest groups, such as the American Legion and
the Veterans of Foreign Wars, to define and enforce their own vision of who was entitled
to enjoy the benefits and privileges of U.S. citizenship. It showed how those
organizations could marginalize members of smaller, less-organized groups and reduce
them to second-class citizenship, as the Legion and VFW campaigned to remove COs
from public jobs and to deny them welfare and other benefits created by the nation’s
growing bureaucratic state.
New fears over national security gripped the nation after World War II and fueled
anger and suspicion about conscientious objectors and their beliefs. Concerns over
nuclear weapons and conflicts with the Soviet Union generated a sense of vulnerability
among Americans. U.S. citizens no longer felt strategically or geographically isolated
from the dangers of international conflict.11 Those fears generated heightened concern
about patriotism and loyalty. National unity became synonymous with national
strength.12 In such an environment, many saw objectors as an existential threat to the
nation. For them, the refusal of COs to bear arms in defense of the country struck at the
heart of what it meant to be an American, and therefore, they argued, objectors should not
enjoy the same rights and privileges as the millions of men who had put their lives on
hold and gone overseas to defend their country. Critics of conscientious objectors saw
pacifist ideology as dangerous and subversive, and they sought to protect impressionable
Americans from its influence. Conscientious objectors struggled to assert and protect
their rights of conscience against a wave of political support for guarding the nation
11	
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against the expression of ideas that might interfere with national defense. The
experiences of conscientious objectors in the aftermath of World War II mirrored those of
other individuals who saw their constitutional rights threatened as a result of allegations
that they were disloyal.
Conscientious objectors encountered distrust and discrimination during and after
World War II because they challenged a fundamental concept of American society—that
an individual’s ability to demand recognition by the state of his economic rights and civil
liberties was premised on his willingness to provide military service to the state when the
nation’s interests were threatened. As the United States drifted towards involvement in
World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt reminded Americans of this reciprocal
relationship that provided the foundation of U.S. citizenship. In message to Congress on
January 6, 1941, Roosevelt identified Four Freedoms that served as the pillars of
American society. They were freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from
want, and freedom from fear.13 According to Roosevelt, the nation’s commitment to
those four freedoms established that U.S. citizens were entitled to certain basic privileges
and protections, including equal opportunity, the right to work, and the protection of their
civil liberties.14 If forced to do so, Americans would fight to protect those rights and
freedoms from the enemies of democracy menacing Europe.15 Roosevelt’s address
contained an implicit quid pro quo. Americans could claim the benefits flowing from the
Four Freedoms only if they were willing to fight to defend them.
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Since the Revolutionary War, Americans had linked citizenship with the
obligation to bear arms in defense of the nation.16 The involvement of the United States
in World War II further strengthened that connection between military service and
citizenship. Sixteen million men and women served in the United States military during
World War II. They helped liberate Europe from Hitler and defeated the Japanese forces
in the Pacific. They stormed the beaches at Normandy on D-day. They fought to reclaim
one island after another in the Pacific. Some witnessed first hand the horrors of the
concentration camps. They fought and won the “Good War.” After World War II, most
Americans experienced none of the doubts about the nation’s military actions that had
plagued the nation after World War I. For most, it had been a battle worth fighting. The
men who were drafted and sent to fight it returned as heroes who had established their
right to demand all the benefits and protections Roosevelt had enumerated in his speech
on the Four Freedoms.17
During the post World War II years, two national veterans’ organizations, the
American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars emerged as the most vocal and
powerful proponents of the link between citizenship and military service. For male
members of those organizations, the two were inextricably linked. The Legion and VFW
were powerful lobbying organizations that commanded the attention of Congress. Each
year, the minutes of the VFW’s annual meetings (called an encampment) were sent to the
House Armed Services Committee. The minutes from the Legion’s annual meetings were
referred to the House Committee on Veteran’s Affairs. The United States Government
Printing Office printed and distributed the minutes from both meetings. The documents
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consisted of hundreds of pages of proposals, reports and resolutions that expressed
opinions on a variety of issues of national importance. The preamble to a resolution the
Legion sent to Congress in 1951 calling for harsher treatment of conscientious objectors
exemplified the connection between citizenship and military service at the heart of
Legion and VFW philosophy. The Legion quoted President George Washington: “It may
be laid down as a primary position that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free
government owes not only a proportion of his property, but his personal services to its
defense, and consequently that the citizens of America be accustomed to the use of arms
and to be employed whenever it may become necessary in the service of their country.”18
The ranks and prestige of the Legion and VFW soared following World War II as
American soldiers returned home. In 1946, the Legion had 3.3 million members, and
membership in the VFW stood at 1.5 million.19 The Legion and VFW counted presidents
and senators among their members. The two organizations shared a common agenda.
They both sought better care and treatment for wounded veterans. They lobbied for the
payment of bonuses to veterans, for pensions, and for health care.20 Both organizations
were integrally involved in the passage of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944,
known as the GI Bill.21 The broad terms of the GI Bill and its support of American
veterans testified to the legislative influence wielded by the Legion and by the VFW as
well as to the gratitude Americans felt toward the individuals who had protected the
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nation during an international crisis of the greatest magnitude. Under the GI Bill, the
federal government paid college tuition for returning veterans, guaranteed loans that
allowed veterans to start businesses and buy homes, offered job-placement services, and
improved Veterans Administration hospitals and healthcare services.22 Through the GI
Bill, the nation extended a multitude of economic benefits and opportunities to the
soldiers who had fought on its behalf.23
Since conscientious objectors refused to fight on behalf of the nation, the Legion
and VFW contended that COs were not entitled to the benefits of citizenship enjoyed by
other Americans. The two veterans’ organizations sought to deny objectors equal
opportunity for economic security and protection of civil rights Roosevelt identified as
hallmarks of citizenship in his Four Freedoms address to Congress. Proposals the Legion
and VFW sent to Congress reflected the sentiments of the veterans’ organizations on this
issue. At its meeting in 1945, the VFW adopted a resolution that expressed the
organization’s strong support for “not releasing any of the said so-called conscientious
objectors [from the CPS camps] until all of our fighting men have been returned home
and discharged from military service.”24 Since the government did not pay the objectors
in CPS camps for their labor, the VFW proposal was aimed not only at the civil liberties
of COs but at their economic rights as well.
Other proposals made by the Legion and VFW were more ominous and punitive.
The VFW annual meeting in 1945 generated a proposal that all conscientious objectors
employed in state and federal institutions be “restricted and visibly identified on and off
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duty.”25 The VFW did not specify what degree of restraint and identification its members
had in mind when they drafted the resolution. The VFW also recommended “that
conscientious objectors be denied employment with the federal government, that federal
aid be withheld from any program or project on which any conscientious objectors are
employed or listed on the pay roll, and that all federal aid and relief for the needy be
withheld from conscientious objectors and their families.”26 In 1950, the Legion
bemoaned the fact that no action had been taken on its resolution passed in 1946, urging
“Congress and state legislatures to enact suitable legislation to prevent employment in a
Civil Service job of the federal, state or local subdivisions of the government of the
United States of any person or persons, excluding those whose service was in the
noncombatant branches of the armed forces, who was or is a conscientious objector or
who refused to serve his country in the defense thereof.”27 Much to the consternation of
the Legion, Congress had not adopted any policy prohibiting the employment of
conscientious objectors, and government agencies were considering such individuals for
civil service jobs.28 Though not enacted, resolutions like these were designed to
stigmatize conscientious objectors and separate them from the rest of society. They were
also aimed at denying COs the economic benefits and financial security the expanding
federal government promised to the nation’s citizens. According the Legion and VFW,
objectors had forfeited those privileges of citizenship by following their consciences
instead of fighting to defend the country.
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Objectors and their supporters fought back as best they could by presenting a
positive image of COs. A network of diverse organizations assisted conscientious
objectors and promoted their interests. Those groups included the Mennonite and Quaker
churches. Members of those denominations lobbied Congress whenever draft legislation
was under consideration and promoted inclusion of language excusing members of their
churches from military service. They also counseled church members about the draft law
and about how to secure recognition as conscientious objectors. The Seventh Day
Adventist Church supported its members who refused to fight by publishing articles
about their courage and bravery. The Adventist publication, The Advent Review and
Sabbath Herald, maintained that young men who refused to fight displayed the same
level of commitment and resolve as American soldiers. It was “shallow thinking,” said
The Review and Herald, that mistook conviction for cowardice.29 The Review and Herald
extolled the bravery of conscientious objectors serving in the medical corp.30 When
Private Desmond Doss received the Congressional Medal of Honor in October 1945 for
his treatment and evacuation of American soldiers during the battle for Okinawa, the
national news media covered the event.31 A similar story received national attention in
1953, when Alvin Joyner, a CO serving as a medic in Korea, led a group of wounded
men to safety.32 Conscientious objectors and their supporters presented these stories as
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proof that an individual could follow his conscience and still be a loyal, valuable, and
courageous citizen.
The battle over conscience and citizenship was not simply a rhetorical contest
waged in the media and in the halls of Congress. It was also fought in council hearings,
school board meetings and other venues where Legion and VFW members spearheaded
actions to remove conscientious objectors from public jobs. Those direct actions against
conscientious objectors began during World War II and continued after it ended. The
actions of the Legion and VFW usually targeted conscientious objectors working as
schoolteachers or as playground supervisors. The veterans’ groups alleged that COs
working with children might exert undue influence over their young charges and convert
them to their pacifist ideology. But the vigor with which the Legion and the VFW
pursued the termination of objectors holding public jobs suggested that more was at
stake. By refusing to fight, conscientious objectors had broken a sacred covenant of
citizenship. The veterans subsequently saw objectors being rewarded with public jobs.
In the eyes of veterans, the soldiers who fought World War II, not COs, had earned the
security those jobs provided. The income and security of public employment represented
the benefits of citizenship Roosevelt had promised to the nation’s defenders in the Four
Freedoms address. Fears that conscientious objectors spread ideas detrimental to the
nation’s security fueled the turmoil over the public employment of COs, but so did an
acrimonious debate over who did and did not deserve the rewards of citizenship. Hoping
to insure that their views and interests would prevail, veterans campaigned to end the
public employment of objectors.
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The American Legion’s efforts in Los Angeles, California illustrated how
demands that a municipal agency fire a single objector could ignite public outrage against
the employment of all COs. On March 1, 1944, L.F. Olson, a regional commander of the
American Legion, appeared before the Los Angeles City Counsel and accused the City of
hiring conscientious objectors. Olson identified Edward D. Simon as one of the objectors
employed by the City. A graduate of Occidental College, Simon had participated in
various peace organizations before World War II. When the war broke out, he failed to
report for induction into the army. Prosecuted for draft evasion, Simon pled guilty. The
court paroled him on the condition that he enter a CPS camp. After Simon was released
from the camp, the City of Los Angeles hired him as the recreation director for the
Verdugo Playground in Eagle Rock and as director of the Eagle Rock Little Theater.33
Standing before the Los Angeles City Counsel, Commander Olson expressed
outrage over the employment of Simon. He asserted that Simon’s position gave him the
opportunity to impose his dangerous ideas on children.34 “The American Legion,” Olsen
asserted, “believes that this man, or others of his ilk, should never be employed to
supervise the children of Americans who are fighting and dying in the South Pacific, the
beach head at Anzio and on countless other fighting fronts all over the world.”35 Olsen
asked, “should such a man be placed in the position where he can tell these children that
their fathers were mistaken fools to defend their country?”36
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Simon denied using his position to impose his pacifist ideology on children, but to
no avail. The City fired him a few hours after Olson’s appearance before the council.37
The matter did not end there. Delamore R. McCloskey, a member of the Los Angeles
City Council, alleged that “there are other similar instances of this in city service.”
McCloskey demanded further investigation and warned that, “if it is found to be true, the
Civil Service Department should be brought to strict account.”38 The All City Employees
Association went on the record as well, stating its bitter opposition “to the employment of
conscientious objectors.”39 The Legion’s attack against Simon proved wildly successful.
Not only did the City fire Simon, but the employment of all objectors by the City was
loudly condemned. However, a proposed ordinance banning the employment of all
conscientious objectors failed when the city attorney’s office advised the council that
such a measure would violate the city’s charter.40
An American Legion Post in Virginia initiated a similar action against COs. In
September 1944, the Legion Post adopted resolutions opposing the employment of
conscientious objectors at the College of William and Mary. The resolutions were based
on a report from a committee at the Post alleging that two conscientious objectors were
then employed at the College. The Legion demanded that the College immediately fire
the two men, even if no replacements were immediately available to fill their spots on the
faculty. In the Legion’s view, William and Mary’s hiring of conscientious objectors “was
not in keeping with the great record of that institution in all former wars in which this
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State and Nation have participated.”41 On October 7, 1944, the College’s Board met to
discuss the Legion’s demands but took no further action at that time.42
The Legion’s actions against conscientious objectors and pacifist ideals took place
during an era of hyper-patriotism. Individuals who encouraged claims of conscience in
such an environment put their jobs at risk. For example, in 1945, a Chicago
schoolteacher, Rose K. Royce, lost her job for writing a letter to a former student who
refused to register for the draft. She congratulated her former student on “his courageous
and idealistic stand.”43 At a school board hearing to determine her fate, nine of her
former students testified that on the day following the attack on Pearl Harbor Ms. Royce
said, “we got what was coming to us.” But an equal number of her former pupils denied
that she made such a statement. The Illinois Court of Appeals upheld her termination.44
The Royce case foreshadowed the prosecution of Larry Gara three years later for
advising Rickert not to abandon his beliefs. During the war and after, opponents and
critics of conscientious objectors continued to see them as disloyal purveyors of
dangerous ideas and exhibited little compunction over abridging the civil liberties of
COs.
An editorial that appeared in The Los Angeles Times on June 12, 1945
exemplified the precarious political and economic position of conscientious objectors as
World War II drew to a close. The editorial praised the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in In re. Summers (1945). Summers had applied for admission to the
Illinois State Bar. The Bar had denied his application because Summers was a
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conscientious objector. The Supreme Court upheld the decision.45 The Times cheered.
“Those who will not agree to defend a state or the nation are certainly not entitled to
claim favors from either. . . .The conchies ought not to be able to eat their cake and have
it. If we grant them exemption from bearing arms we are to be excused if we expect
them to pay for the exemption in some ways.” The Times concluded by opining that: “As
a special group of our citizens, the conchies already have been favored too much as it
is.”46 The Times, like other critics of conscientious objectors, felt COs had severed their
connection with nation by refusing to fight. Accordingly, they could not expect to enjoy
the same rights and privileges other Americans did.
The Legion and VFW continued their actions against conscientious objectors after
the end of World War II. Though the end of hostilities against Germany and Japan may
have reduced some of the rancor that grew between opponents and supporters of COs
during the War, the veterans’ organizations continued their campaigns to restrict the
rights and privileges of objectors. Two of the most acrimonious encounters occurred in
Virginia. In September 1946, the Smyth County American Legion Post adopted a
resolution calling for the resignation of a High School teacher in Marion, Evan
Hollingsworth, because of his conscientious objection to participation in World War II.
Both Hollingsworth and his wife resigned their teaching posts.47 The Staunton-Augusta
Post of the VFW then passed a similar resolution in October 1946. The resolution said
that the VFW Post objected to the public employment of “any conscientious objector who
refused to wear the uniform of the armed forces of the United States.” The resolution
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singled out Wayne Guthrie, who like Hollingsworth had been a conscientious objector
during World War II. Referring to Guthrie’s employment as a teacher, the VFW claimed,
“that it does not serve the interests of the future generations when such a man is in a
position of influence and responsibility when said man had the temerity to refuse to
defend or aid the military effort of his country in time of war. We feel that this situation
is intolerable and is a disgrace to our system of government.”48 After reviewing the
VFW’s resolution, the school superintendent, A. Crawford Gilkeson, had a “frank”
discussion with Guthrie. Gilkeson told Guthrie that “it might not be too pleasant for him
to remain” and that “it might not be too good for the school if he remained.” Guthrie also
resigned.49
The actions against Hollingsworth and Guthrie in Virginia did not go as smoothly
as the termination of Simon in Los Angeles. The Virginia cases garnered negative
national publicity, and questions arose about infringement on the sanctity of conscience.
The protests began in Virginia when B.L. Dickson, the mayor of Marion, quit his position
as chairman of the school board in protest over the treatment of Hollingsworth. Dickson
questioned the legality of cancelling a teacher’s contract “on the sole ground of the
teacher’s conscientious objection.”50 More importantly, he implied that the Legion had
resorted to more than hyperbolic rhetoric to secure Hollingsworth’s resignation.
Dickenson wrote that, “I cannot and will not enter into a political fight against the leaders
of the veterans’ organizations and I have no practicable way of combatting the physical
attack on the teacher in question who is being openly threatened by members of the
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veterans’ organizations: I have therefore turned in my resignation from the school
board.”51
Virginia’s Lieutenant Governor, Lewis Collins also suggested that violence, or at
least the threat of violence, lurked in Marion. Defending his role in drafting the Legion
resolution that led to the resignation of Hollingsworth, Collins said that, “the town was
ablaze over the whole matter. Some parents already had taken their children out of
school. The Veterans of Foreign Wars had passed a strong resolution on the subject.
Anything could have happened. The situation just couldn’t continue. Something had to
be done.”52
More debate about the Legion’s action in Marion followed. The Virginia Council
of Churches questioned the propriety of Lieutenant Governor Collins’ involvement in the
matter. The Council of Churches accused Collins of placing a “stigma upon the
reputation of this State.”53 Referring to the Legion’s encroachment on his freedom of
conscience, Hollingsworth wondered why someone with Collins’ political and legal
experience would sign a resolution “which is in direct opposition to the Virginia
ordinance of religious freedom.”54 The New York Times noted the turmoil in Virginia and
observed that the Virginia press had been “virtually unanimous in condemning the
veterans for their attitude.” According to the New York Times, the Virginia Press had
expressed particular concern “because these things occurred in the State which gave to
the world George Mason’s Bill of Rights and Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of
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Independence.”55 On the other hand, the Kingsport News in Tennessee supported the
results of the Legion’s and VFW’s efforts, if not their reasoning. The News assumed that
a majority of Americans agreed with the proposition that an individual must bear arms to
defend his country. The average American, said the News, does “not want his children to
get contrary ideas in his head; the average American citizen has a right to say what his
child shall be taught and not taught.” According to the Kingsport News, the issue was
whether parents had a right to fear that a teacher who was a conscientious objector was
more likely to make his students sympathetic to his pacifist ideology. The paper thought
they did. Since most Americans opposed the views of conscientious objectors, COs did
not belong in the classrooms of public schools.56
Labeling the ideals of COs as dangerous, the Legion and the VFW sought to limit
objectors’ freedom of expression by demanding that they be fired from positions that
might allow them to preach their pacifist philosophy to others. As the resolutions
submitted to Congress by the Legion and VFW disclosed, however, the veterans’
organizations also insisted that COs be banned from all city, state, and federal
employment, not just from positions where they might influence others. The dubious
logic about stopping the spread of ideas that might have a negative impact on the national
defense was at best only part of the story. The Legion and VFW intended to punish
conscientious objectors and to deny them the right a sense of financial—and even
physical—security. The firings in Virginia added a new element—the threat of violence.
Like other marginalized groups, such as blacks in the Jim Crow South, conscientious
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objectors targeted by their opponents could not be confident of either their economic or
physical security.
It was, however, the quest to win amnesty for conscientious objectors convicted
of violating the draft laws that best illustrated the political impotence of COs and the
clout of their opponents. It also reminded objectors of the continuing price they paid for
following their conscience and that powerful groups like the Legion and VFW wanted to
relegate them to a form of second-class citizenship. The push for amnesty began shortly
after the end of World War II. In a letter to the New York Times published on July 14,
1946, the Committee for Amnesty urged President Harry Truman to release all
conscientious objectors still in prison. The committee also beseeched him to grant
amnesty to all conscientious objectors who had been convicted of violating the draft laws
and thereby restore their civil rights, since state and federal laws prohibited convicts from
voting, serving on juries, and holding certain government jobs. The committee noted the
long tradition of extending presidential pardons to individuals who had opposed the
government over issues of conscience, citing the pardon granted by President George
Washington to participants in the Whiskey Rebellion in 1795. The Committee argued
that conscientious objectors had acted “from the highest motives, and their continued
punishment violates our precious heritage of freedom of conscience and religion and
speaks ill of the state of civil liberties after a war fought in the name of the Four
Freedoms.”57 Conscientious Objectors did not belong in jail, said the Committee, and
they deserved to have their civil rights restored.
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The pro-amnesty forces seemed to have momentum on their side. A number of
churches and peace organizations joined the movement. Members of those groups
protested in front of the White House and outside prisons where conscientious objectors
were held. Some jailed conscientious objectors initiated hunger strikes to call attention to
their plight.58 The imprisoned COs seemed to have the support of the public in their camp
as well. A Gallup Poll published in 1947 found that 69% of Americans queried about the
subject favored releasing from prison men who had refused “to serve in the any way in
the armed forces” during World War II.59 Individuals expressing support for the release
of imprisoned COs included 73% of all women who responded to the survey, 65% of all
male respondents, and 63% of World War II veterans asked about the issue.60 At the
same time, Americans remained concerned about defense of the nation. Another poll
conducted in January 1947 found that 72% of all Americans favored mandatory military
training of one year for all able-bodied young men, and in July 1947, 53% of survey
respondents agreed that the United States would be involved in another war within the
next five years.61 Given the strong support for military training and fears of impending
conflict, the survey results did not necessarily reflect lessening public suspicion of
conscientious objectors or reduced concern about the dangers posed by their pacifist
ideology. The results might have reflected no more than a general feeling that COs who
refused to serve in any capacity had been punished enough. A poll conducted in
December 1940 had found that 55% of Americans felt incarceration for one year was an
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appropriate penalty for a group of divinity students who refused to register for the draft.62
By the time the amnesty movement coalesced, many objectors had languished in prison
for much longer.63
President Truman created an amnesty board to study the issue. The board
consisted of former Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, former President of the
American Bar Association Willis Smith, and James F. O’Neil, police chief of
Manchester, New Hampshire, and former Vice Chairman of the American Legion
Americanization Committee.64 Truman’s appointment of O’Neil to the board must have
troubled supporters of the amnesty petition, since the Legion and VFW steadfastly
opposed the early release of conscientious objectors from prison and all proposals for
amnesty. The VFW made its position known in the minutes of its annual meeting in
1945. The VFW went on record as being “strongly opposed to the release of any of those
persons sentenced to prison for violation of the selective service laws until they have
served their sentence in full.”65 The Legion raised its voice in opposition as well. In May
1946, the Legion’s Sixth District passed a resolution opposing any action to grant
amnesty to conscientious objectors. 66
Conscientious objectors and the pro-amnesty forces waited one year for the board
to submit its recommendations to President Truman. The Presidential order Truman
issued based on the report fully adopted all of the board’s findings and recommendations.
The order released only three objectors from prison and pardoned only 1500 of all
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conscientious objectors convicted of violating the draft law. The President pardoned only
those objectors who had refused to serve based on religious training and conviction. The
board specifically rejected the applications of all Jehovah’s Witnesses. The board also
refused to release or grant pardons to any secular conscientious objectors, criticizing
those individuals for having “set themselves up as wiser and more competent than society
to determine their duty to come to the defense of the nation.”67 Most important, there was
no general amnesty restoring the civil rights of the thousands of objectors already
released from prison68
Truman’s order disheartened and angered COs and their allies. The decisions of
the Board struck the Christian Century as being capricious. The magazine quoted from
examples offered by A.J. Muste, the famous pacifist and chairman of the Committee for
Amnesty: “Two boys grew up together and went to prison together; one is listed [as
eligible for a pardon] and the other is not. Eight theological students at Union Seminary
refused to register in 1940. . . .Two are included; why not the other six? A Brethren
minister who refused to serve in C.P.S. is granted pardon, but not Methodists,
Presbyterians and others who took the same position.”69 In light of these inequities, the
Christian Century urged COs and their supporters to continue their quest to secure a
general amnesty restoring the civil rights of all conscientious objectors.70 They did,
commencing another campaign in December 1949.71 To attract attention to their cause
during the holiday season, supporters of COs dressed as Santa Claus and picketed the
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White House.72 The pro-amnesty forces continued their efforts into the 1950s. When
protesters again appeared at the White House in 1955, it marked the tenth year of the
movement to vindicate the rights of COs.73 They never succeeded. In the absence of a
general amnesty, individuals who had followed their conscience continued to be
stigmatized and punished for the rest of their lives. Rights enjoyed by other citizens lay
beyond their grasp.
The failure of conscientious objectors to secure a general amnesty restoring their
rights as citizens underscored the power of their opponents. Though the majority of
Americans had apparently favored at least releasing objectors from prison, the agenda of
the Legion and the VFW had prevailed. Well-organized and having earned their political
legitimacy through military service, the veterans’ organizations possessed sufficient
political power and influence to develop and enforce their own definition of U.S.
citizenship and, apparently, to override public opinion if necessary.
Other events also reminded objectors and pacifists of their vulnerability and
exclusion from opportunities enjoyed by other Americans. In April 1946, the head of the
Veterans’ Administration, General Omar N. Bradley, prohibited the employment of draft
law evaders, including conscientious objectors, by V.A. hospitals. The American Legion
had informed the Veterans Administration that conscientious objectors were working at
the V.A. Hospital in Los Angeles. A federal judge had sent conscientious objectors there
to alleviate a staffing shortage.74 In another incident, four travellers from abroad were

72	
  "	
  Santas	
  Picket	
  White	
  House;	
  Ask	
  Pardons,"	
  Chicago	
  Daily	
  Tribune,	
  December	
  25,	
  1949,	
  2.	
  
73	
  "	
  Pickets	
  at	
  White	
  House,"	
  New	
  York	
  Times,	
  December	
  11,	
  1955,	
  58.	
  
74	
  "Bradley	
  Bans	
  Hiring	
  of	
  Draft	
  Act	
  Violators,"	
  Los	
  Angeles	
  Times	
  April	
  24,	
  1946,	
  1.	
  As	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  CPS	
  

program,	
  conscientious	
  objectors	
  worked	
  at	
  hospitals	
  and	
  mental	
  institutions	
  during	
  World	
  War	
  II.	
  	
  
Historians	
  have	
  noted	
  the	
  high-‐level	
  of	
  care	
  and	
  compassion	
  they	
  provided	
  to	
  their	
  patients.	
  COs	
  

35

detained at Ellis Island in July of 1950. The detainees hoped to attend a meeting of
Jehovah’s Witnesses in New York. The District Immigration Director reported that the
group was being “investigated as aliens who may hold pacifist views dangerous to the
United States.”75 Opponents and critics of COs continued spreading their message that
conscientious objectors threatened the nation’s security.
In this atmosphere of anger and suspicion about conscientious objectors and their
ideas, a number of cases addressing the rights and privileges of COs reached the United
States Supreme Court following World War II. Many of those cases involved procedural
questions concerning the interactions between draft boards and conscientious objectors,
such as the ability of a draftee to challenge in court the refusal of his draft board to
recognize him as a CO, the procedures draft boards had to follow to insure that a CO
applicant received a fair hearing, and the criteria courts should employ when reviewing
draft board decisions. Other cases, like Girouard v. United States considered whether
foreigners who were conscientiously opposed to military service were eligible for United
States citizenship.76 Larry Gara’s case reached the Court as well, testing the limits of free
speech and the right of COs to encourage others to follow their consciences. Those cases
involved, in one way or another, concern with the protection of conscience, and in those
decisions, members of the Court argued about why the protection of conscience mattered
and who—the court or the legislature—should extend that protection. These were not
new questions. Rather, Supreme Court Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis D.
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Brandeis had raised the same issues thirty years earlier in a number of famous cases
generated by World War I. Those previous cases had also posed questions about the
protection of conscience, and the debate over why and how conscience should be
accommodated had started there. Evaluating the post World War II cases involving
conscientious objectors therefore must start with an examination of those World War I
era decisions.
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Chapter Two
Conscience becomes an Issue: World War I and The Judicial Debate over the
Protection of Beliefs
Thirty years before the prosecution of Larry Gara, cases involving conscientious
objectors, pacifists, and other opponents of the draft and military service provided a
forum in which some of the twentieth century’s greatest legal minds debated the extent to
which the First Amendment to the United States Constitution protected the right of the
individual to express his ideals and beliefs, even if those ideals and beliefs criticized or
threatened the government or its policies. Those cases, which included Schenk v. United
States, Frohwerk v. United States, Debs v. United States, Abrams v. United States, and
Gilbert v. Minnesota involved individuals who in one way or another challenged the
ability of the United States government to wage war and who in the eyes of many
therefore threatened and undermined the nation’s existence.1 Those cases demanded that
the Supreme Court determine when and to what extent the expression of one’s conscience
through the exercise of his or her right of free speech must yield to the state’s right to
maintain order and protect itself and its citizens. Those cases also forced the justices of
the Supreme Court to articulate when and why speech, even if seditious, should be
protected. The World War I cases involving opposition to war and military conscription
presented fundamental questions about the nature of democratic government, such as the
degree of protection the Constitution afforded unpopular points of view and the role
freedom of expression played in a democratic society. Those cases challenged the Court
to define the role it would play in striking a balance between the protection of speech and
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conscience on the one hand and the interests of the government in maintaining order and
security on the other. In those post World War I cases, the Court’s most prominent
members stuggled to create a framework for answering the troubling, central question of
the Gara case: Could the government punish an individual for encouraging others to
follow their consciences?
The cases involving draft and war resistance that arose from World War I
demonstrated how the Court sought to define the boundaries between government power
and the protection of speech and conscience. Following the lead of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, the Court developed the “clear and present danger test” as a means of
determining when the government could abridge the right of free speech. First articulated
by Holmes in Schenck v. United States, the clear and present danger test allowed the
suppression of speech that created an immediate and proximate threat of harm.2 Even
after Holmes eloquently introduced the clear and present danger rule in Schenck,
however, the parameters of the new standard and its limits were not initially apparent. In
subsequent decisions, many of which were written in dissent, Holmes and then Justice
Louis D. Brandeis each developed his own rationale for why the government should
protect the expression of ideas, and by doing so, they won recognition as the leading
protectors of conscience.
For Holmes, freedom of speech benefited the state by creating a marketplace of
ideas that competed against each other; the best ideas prevailed and propelled society
forward. Brandeis, on the other hand, emphasized the benefits of free speech to the
individual and saw the right to hold and express one’s beliefs on matters of national
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importance as one the most important and cherished rights of citizenship. A third
powerful voice eventually joined the debate as well. Building on Holmes’ theories about
the benefit of speech to society and its relation to state power, a future Supreme Court
Justice, Felix Frankfurter, contended that the state, not the courts, should determine the
limits of protections for civil liberties. Frankfurter argued that in determining the limits
of speech and conscience the courts should defer to the judgment of legislatures and
administrative agencies.
This chapter traces the development of these different rationales for the protection
of speech and conscience in cases involving The Espionage Act and The Sedition Act
that the Supreme Court heard in the years after World War I. Those cases provided a
basis for analysis of subsequent judicial decisions involving conscientious objectors.
Some of the reasons first developed by Holmes and Brandeis for protecting speech
appeared in later cases extending the legal protection afforded objectors. Other cases,
like Gara, demonstrated the judicial restraint and deference to legislative and
administrative decisions that Frankfurter advocated. Those subsequent decisions will be
the subject of the following chapters.
World War I marked a turning point in the history of constitutional protection of
speech and conscience. Before a number of cases generated by opposition to conscription
and World War I reached the Court, the constitutional law concerning the freedom of
speech remained largely undefined. In fact, based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Patterson v. Colorado (1907), the First Amendment appeared to do no more than prohibit
the prior restraint of speech.3
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The government’s campaign to stamp out opposition to World War I through the
prosecution of dissenters under the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act 1918
worried some legal scholars at that time, most particularly Zechariah Chafee Jr. A
professor at Harvard Law School who gained recognition as the most influential and
perceptive of the postwar World War I commentators on the struggle to define
civil liberties law, Chafee corresponded with prominent judges like Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Learned Hand, a federal district court judge and later
the chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. A preeminent jurist
and legal philosopher whose opinions were often quoted by the Supreme Court, Hand
shared Chafee’s concerns about the law governing civil liberties. Chafee’s letters to
Hand and Holmes focused on what Chafee saw as the most important constitutional issue
of the era—the protection of ideas and speech.4 Chafee shuddered at the ease with which
most federal district court judges had convicted individuals charged with obstructing the
war effort for doing no more than expressing their political beliefs, and he lamented the
deleterious effect of the wartime prosecutions on civil liberties.5 Chafee believed that the
government could legitimately suppress speech when necessary to protect order and
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security. But Chafee maintained that government suppression of speech had far exceeded
what was legitimate or wise. Chafee advocated the establishment of clear judicial
guidelines governing prosecutions of speech—standards that would apply in times of
peace as well as war. Chafee saw the law governing speech and dissent as too vague and
amorphous. Consist with traditional principles of common law, Chafee contended that the
courts must clarify the legal doctrine governing the expression of ideas so that individuals
could conform their behavior to the law.6
Chafee identified two reasons for protecting speech. “There is an individual
interest,” he said, “the need of many men to express their opinions on matters vital to
them if life is to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the
country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest
way."7 As this passage demonstrates, Chafee posited a private or individual basis, as well
as a public one, for the First Amendment’s protection of the expression of ideas. Chafee
saw the protection of speech as a cherished liberty that individuals valued for giving
meaning to their lives. But he identified a public component as well. Debate benefited
society because it led to the discovery of truth. Discourse challenged traditional notions,
which might be discarded if found to be inadequate. Chafee maintained that debate
produced new and better concepts and policies, and he therefore saw it as a crucial
element of democracy. In Free Speech in the United States, Chafee wrote that: “One of
the most important purposes of society and government is the discovery and spread of
truth on subjects of general concern. This is possible only through absolutely unlimited
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discussion.”8 The exchange of ideas, including criticism of the government, remained
important during war, said Chafee. In his view, allowing only supporters of the war to
criticize the government was a grievous error.9
Chafee watched as the United States Supreme Court issued a number of opinions
in the aftermath of World War I that began to define the limits of the freedom of speech.
Justice Holmes took the lead, upholding the conviction of draft opponents in Schenck,
Frohwerk, and Debs, finding in all three cases that, through their words and opposition to
conscription, the defendants had created “a clear and present danger” to the war effort
and to the nation’s security.10 In Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, the clear and present
danger test did little more than provide a justification for conviction of the defendants in
spite of their First Amendment rights. In all three opinions, Holmes did not analyze
whether or not the defendants’ actions actually interfered with the draft or threatened to
impede the war effort. In fact, Holmes opinion in Debs upheld the conviction of the
famous socialist despite instructions by the trial judge to the jury that they should convict
Debs if his speech exhibited the “bad tendency” of encouraging disorder or disobedience
of the law. The “bad tendency’ test for the punishment of speech, which the clear and
present danger test was designed to replace, alarmed Chafee, who lobbied hard against it.
Chafee described the difference between the “bad tendency” and the “clear and present
danger” test as “whether the state can punish words which have some tendency, however
remote, to bring about acts in violation of law, or only words which directly incite to acts
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in violation of law.”11 Since Holmes made no serious attempt to determine either the
proximity or degree of harm threatened by the defendants’ actions in these three cases,
legal scholars have noted that Holmes seemed at that point to have intended to do no
more by his use of clear and present danger than to “create a clever turn of phrase.”12
Then, Holmes famously, and brilliantly, switched direction with a dissenting
opinion in Abrams v. United States (1919). Legal scholars credit Chafee and Hand with
convincing Holmes to reconsider the importance of tolerating unpopular opinions, and
Holmes responded by transforming the clear and present danger test from a rationale for
the punishment of speech in to a bar against its curtailment.13 Justice Brandeis joined
Holmes’ dissenting opinion in Abrams and then began his own body of work on the
subject in Gilbert v. Minnesota (1920).14 In a series of decisions, many of which found
Holmes and Brandeis dissenting, the two justices established themselves as protectors of
speech and conscience. Each, however, approached the protection of speech and
conscience from a different perspective; each chose one of the reasons discussed by
Chafee for the protection of speech—private versus public interests—as the main focus
of his argument.
In Abrams, Holmes argued that protecting speech and conscience benefited
society.15 The defendants in Abrams, who were Russian citizens sympathetic to the
Bolshevik Revolution, had been convicted under the Sedition Act of 1918 for tossing
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handbills critical of Woodrow Wilson and the U.S. Government from a rooftop in New
York City.16 The handbills objected to U.S. intervention against the Bolsheviks in Russia
and urged workers of the world to come to the aid of the fledgling Soviet state. In the
handbills, the defendants called for a general strike by all industrial workers as a means
of protesting American involvement in the Russian Revolution. The majority of the
Supreme Court Justices wasted little time upholding the convictions, citing Holmes’
opinions in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs in support of their conclusion that the actions
of the Abrams defendants were not protected by the First Amendment because they had
created a clear and present danger to the nation’s war efforts. The majority reasoned that
the exhortations of the Abrams’ defendants, though directed against U.S. involvement in
Russia, not against the war with Germany, nonetheless violated the Sedition Act. The
defendants had encouraged factory workers to curtail production, the natural and
foreseeable consequence of which was to hinder the war effort against Germany.
Holmes responded in Abrams with his famous dissent defending the free
expression of ideas, even during wartime. He disagreed with the majority’s position that
the defendants had intended to hinder the nation’s war efforts against Germany (a
prerequisite in Holmes’ mind to their prosecution) and belittled the majority’s contention
that the defendants created a clear and present danger by their actions. Holmes described
the defendants as a small group of misguided individuals whose silly ideas posed no
threat to national security. Characterizing their actions as futile, Holmes argued that the
pamphlets they distributed created no clear and present danger. Accordingly, the
government violated their constitutional rights of free speech by prosecuting them under
16	
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the Sedition Act. Disclosing both his desire to invigorate the clear and present danger test
and his supercilious view of the defendants’ attempts to foment revolution, Holmes wrote
that:
As against dangers peculiar to war, as against others, the principle of the
right to free speech is always the same. It is only the present danger of
immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in
setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not
concerned. Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the mind
of the country. Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing
of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any
immediate danger that its opinions would hinder the success of the
government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do so.17
In Abrams, Holmes provided a cogent and compelling argument for the protection
of speech and conscience under the First Amendment. He did so by grounding the
protection of ideas and their expression in the benefits that tolerance of unpopular views
provided to society. Holmes contended that speech and the freedom of conscience drove
a constant search for knowledge and improvement. Those who failed to recognize their
own fallibility often sought to limit dissent by suppressing speech. Holmes observed
that, “persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical if you have
no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you
naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition.”18 But the danger
posed by censorship became apparent, said Holmes, when society acknowledged that
new ideas constantly competed with and replaced old ones. Holmes wrote that:
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
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ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate
is the theory of our Constitution.19
In his dissent in Abrams, Holmes described ideas as competing with each other in
a constant search for truth. Society could not be certain, noted Holmes, that current
policies and actions were correct. New ideas replaced old ones. Evaluating Holmes’
dissent in Abrams, the historian Thomas Healy characterized it as an acknowledgement
“based on experience, that human judgment is fallible; a recognition, thanks to Mill, that
free speech is the necessary predicate on which our bets about the universe must be
based; and a conviction, inherited from Smith, about the power of free trade and
competition to promote the greater good.”20
Holmes later elaborated on his theory for the protection of speech in Gitlow v.
New York (1925) .21 Gitlow involved a New York statute prohibiting speech aimed at
overthrowing the government. As in Abrams, Holmes believed that dissemination by the
defendants of a pamphlet arguing that communism would eventually triumph and
encouraging workers to unite and revolt created no clear and present danger, and he
objected to the majority’s conclusion that the statute constituted a reasonable exercise of
the state’s police power. Dissenting from the Court’s ruling that the statute had been
constitutionally applied to convict the defendants because the pamphlet they distributed
contained “incendiary” language, Holmes responded by noting that:
Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief, and, if believed, it is
acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy
stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the
expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the
19	
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speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. But
whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before us, it had no
chance of starting a present conflagration. If, in the long run, the beliefs
expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the
dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is
that they should be given their chance and have their way.22
Holmes argument was a practical one. As Chafee noted, the suppression of
radical speech more often than not served only to strengthen the speaker’s resolve and
call attention to his cause. The restriction and punishment of speech inflamed tensions
and increased the danger to the state, as frustrated individuals denied the opportunity to
express their views often worked tirelessly to undermine the government that silenced
them and punished them for their beliefs. In Holmes view, freedom of expression and
conscience helped diffuse radicalism by eliminating the anger censorship generated. In
addition, public discussion would often expose the unpopularity of most radical
doctrines. As Chafee observed, Holmes recognized that it was often more expedient to
allow incendiary ideas to be expressed so that they might spark out of their own accord.23
Holmes’s dissent in Abrams responded to Chafee’s criticism that the opinions
written by Holmes in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs had not adequately considered the
public interest in the free exchange of ideas.24 Having corrected that error, Holmes
concluded his dissent in Abrams by warning against the suppression of unpopular points
of view, suggesting “that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so
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imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the
law that an immediate check is required to save the country.”25
Brandeis joined Holmes’ dissent in Abrams. Based on subsequent decisions, it
appears that Brandeis may have taken the clear and present danger restrictions on
government action more seriously than did Holmes, and scholars credit Brandeis with
further clarifying the doctrine and expanding the protection of speech and conscience.26
As with Holmes, the prosecution of conscientious objectors, pacifists, and other
individuals opposed to military service presented the opportunity for Brandeis to develop
his ideas about the scope of the First Amendment and to establish himself as a champion
of the protection of conscience. In his opinions on the subject, Brandeis expanded on the
reasons offered by Holmes for the protection of unpopular ideas. While Holmes
emphasized that a free society benefited from rigorous debate and the constant testing of
ideas against each other, Brandeis added a second element that Chafee had also
identified—the interest of the individual in being allowed to express his ideas and beliefs.
Brandeis’s opinion in Gilbert v. Minnesota (1920) showed the development of his
thinking on this issue and his concern for the protection of conscience.
Gilbert v. Minnesota involved objection to military service, conscientious
objection, pacifism, and free speech. The State of Minnesota prosecuted Gilbert for
making a speech against U.S. participation in World War I. Gilbert had told his audience
that:
We are going over to Europe to make the world safe for democracy, but I
tell you we had better make America safe for democracy first. You say,
what is the matter with our democracy? I tell you what is the matter with
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it. Have you had anything to say as to who should be President? Have you
had anything to say as to who should be Governor of this state? Have you
had anything to say as to whether we would go into this war? You know
you have not. If this is such a good democracy, for Heaven's sake, why
should we not vote on conscription of men? We were stampeded into this
war by newspaper out to pull England's chestnuts out of the fire for her. I
tell you if they conscripted wealth like they have conscripted men, this
war would not last over forty-eight hours. . . .27
Minnesota law prohibited discouraging or interfering with the enlistment of men in the
U.S. military. The law also forbid public speech against the draft. At an assembly of five
or more people, no one could “advocate or teach, by word of mouth or otherwise, that
men should not enlist in the military or naval forces of the United States or the State of
Minnesota." The statute also made it illegal for any person “to teach or advocate by any
written or printed matter whatsoever, or by oral speech, that the citizens of this state
should not aid or assist the United States in prosecuting or carrying on war with the
public enemies of the United States."28
The Court affirmed Gilbert’s conviction and upheld the constitutionality of
Minnesota’s statute. Writing for the majority, Justice McKenna found that the law did
not improperly encroach on the power of the United States Congress to make war or on
Gilbert’s right of free speech. In addition, McKenna cited Schenck, Frohwerk, Debs, and
Abrams as establishing the ability of the government during wartime to abridge the right
of free speech, especially speech deemed false and malicious or designed to interfere with
recruitment for the armed forces. Referring to Gilbert’s speech, McKenna wrote that,
“every word that he uttered in denunciation of the war was false, was deliberate
misrepresentation of the motives which impelled it and the objects for which it was
prosecuted. He could have had no purpose other than that of which he was charged. It
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would be a travesty on the constitutional privilege he invokes to assign him its
protection.”29
Brandeis dissented in Gilbert, contending that the Minnesota law infringed both
on the exclusive war-making authority of Congress and on the defendant’s constitutional
rights. In his view, Congress possessed exclusive power and authority to determine if the
curtailment of speech opposing military service was warranted or desirable. Echoing
Holmes’ sentiments about the benefits a free exchange of ideas offers a democratic
society, Brandeis argued that Congress might encourage open and vigorous debate about
the merits of military service as the best and most efficient means of defending the
country.30 Congress could reasonably determine that soldiers who were fully apprised of
the arguments for and against military service would prove most reliable. By outlawing
debate about military service, the state of Minnesota denied Congress the opportunity to
pursue such a course.31
It was, however, in those portions of his dissent in which Brandeis developed how
the Minnesota law infringed on the personal rights and privileges guaranteed by the
Constitution that he expanded the rationale for the protection of speech and conscience
beyond Holmes’ argument in Abrams to include the interests of the individual. Brandeis
began by noting that the prohibitions in the Minnesota statute against criticizing or
questioning military service applied in all circumstances, whether or not the nation was at
war and whether or not the defendant’s actions created any clear and present danger.
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Brandeis concluded, therefore, that the Minnesota statute targeted beliefs, not actions, by
making it illegal to teach or advocate that individuals should not make war. Brandeis
also pointed out that “the statute invades the privacy and freedom of the home. Father and
mother may not follow the promptings of religious belief, of conscience, or of conviction,
and teach son or daughter the doctrine of pacifism. If they do, any police officer may
summarily arrest them.”32 Thus, Brandeis argued that the statute improperly abridged the
individual’s right of free speech. Furthermore, he noted that the law “affects rights,
privileges, and immunities of one who is a citizen of the United States, and it deprives
him of an important part of his liberty. These are rights which are guaranteed protection
by the federal Constitution, and they are invaded by the statute in question.”33
Emphasizing the importance of these rights, Brandeis wrote that, “the right to speak
freely concerning functions of the federal government is a privilege or immunity of every
citizen of the United States which, even before the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a state was powerless to curtail.”34 He continued, observing that, “the right
of a citizen of the United States to take part, for his own or the country's benefit, in the
making of federal laws and in the conduct of the government necessarily includes the
right to speak or write about them, to endeavor to make his own opinion concerning laws
existing or contemplated prevail, and, to this end, to teach the truth as he sees it.”35
Since, in his opinion, the Minnesota law interfered with the exclusive war-making
authority of Congress, Brandeis did not feel compelled to decide if the statute also
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by restricting the rights of speech and conscience,
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though he made clear that he thought it did.36 In closing, Brandeis remarked that he found
it difficult to believe that the Fourteenth Amendment “does not include liberty to teach,
either in the privacy of the home or publicly, the doctrine of pacifism, so long, at least, as
Congress has not declared that the public safety demands its suppression. I cannot believe
that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes only liberty to acquire
and to enjoy property.”37
In his dissent in Gilbert, Brandeis argued for the defense of conscience and
speech based on the importance of those rights to the individual. According to Brandeis,
the right to hold and express his own beliefs allowed the individual to participate
meaningfully in democratic debates. This imparted dignity and meaning to the
individual. Brandeis regarded the protection of speech and conscience as being closely
aligned with the right of privacy. He made clear in Gilbert that an individual should be
free to maintain and promote his own ideas unless doing so created an immediate danger
to others. He saw the mind and the realm of personal beliefs as a protected area, similar
to one’s home, where the government might not intrude unless absolutely necessary.
Brandeis acknowledged that protection of the First Amendment freedoms benefited
society as well. He believed in and often espoused the value to society of the
marketplace of ideas. At the same time, he identified the importance of the First
Amendment freedoms to the individual, and in doing so, Brandeis paved the way for
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future decisions that would finally afford speech and conscience the degree of protection
he believed they deserved.
Holmes separately noted his concurrence with McKenna’s majority decision in
Gilbert, but did not write an opinion. Consequently, his thoughts about the case remain a
mystery. Even though McKenna made no attempt to gauge either the degree or
proximity of the danger created by Gilbert’s speech, perhaps Holmes thought that the
government had made a sufficient showing that a clear and present danger existed.
Lacking Brandeis’s concern for the rights of individuals confronted by the power of the
state, Holmes voted to affirm Gilbert’s conviction. Consequently, Gilbert illustrated the
significance of the differences between the justifications offered by Holmes and Brandeis
for the protection of ideas and beliefs and the divergent results that followed from them.
Holmes, concerned primarily with the interests of society as a whole and the power of the
state, did not find the Minnesota statute objectionable. Brandeis, on the other hand,
viewed the law as an unwarranted intrusion into the protected private sphere of the
individual’s conscience, and he therefore maintained that the Minnesota statute was
unconstitutional.
Two other dissenting opinions authored by Brandeis in cases arising from the
suppression of radicalism during World War I manifested his concern for personal
liberty. Those cases, Pierce v. United States and Schaeffer v. United States, both decided
in 1920, involved prosecutions under the Espionage Act of 1917.38 In each case, the
government charged the defendants with attempting to undermine the morale of the
United States military. The defendants in Schaefer published a German-language
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newspaper in which they reprinted war stories from other sources. The government
alleged they altered those stories in ways that derided America’s war effort. In Pierce,
the defendants distributed a pamphlet titled The Price We Pay that criticized the war and
promoted socialism. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions of the defendants in both
cases, and in both cases, Brandeis, joined by Holmes, dissented. Brandeis saw no clear
and present danger generated by the defendants’ actions in either Pierce or Schaefer. He
described the statements in The Price We Pay as no more than the expression of opinions,
the accuracy of which could not be determined, and even if untruthful, the changes to
news stories made by the Schaefer defendants were, in Brandeis’ view, minor and
inconsequential. Of the defendants’ actions in Pierce, Brandeis wrote: “A verdict should
have been directed for the defendants on these counts also because the leaflet was not
distributed under such circumstances, nor was it of such a nature, as to create a clear and
present danger of causing either insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in
the military or naval forces.”39 As Holmes had done in Abrams, Brandeis characterized
the actions of the defendants in Pierce and Schaefer as silly and futile. Brandeis
observed in Pierce that: “Insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, and refusal of duty in the
military or naval forces are very serious crimes. It is not conceivable that any man of
ordinary intelligence and normal judgment would be induced by anything in the leaflet to
commit them, and thereby risk the severe punishment prescribed for such offenses.
Certainly there was no clear and present danger that such would be the result.”40
Brandeis concluded his dissents in Pierce and Schaefer by expressing his concern
about the potential impact on civil liberties of the prosecutions in those cases. In Pierce,
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Brandeis commented that, “the fundamental right of free men to strive for better
conditions through new legislation and new institutions will not be preserved if efforts to
secure it by argument to fellow citizens may be construed as criminal incitement to
disobey the existing law—merely because the argument presented seems to those
exercising judicial power to be unfair in its portrayal of existing evils, mistaken in its
assumptions, unsound in reasoning, or intemperate in language. No objections more
serious than these can, in my opinion, reasonably be made to the arguments presented in
"‘The Price We Pay’.”41 Brandeis ended his dissent in Schaefer by stressing the
importance of freedom of conscience and objecting to governmental intrusion into the
thoughts and beliefs of the individual. Brandeis wrote that, “the jury which found men
guilty for publishing news items or editorials like those here in question must have
supposed it to be within their province to condemn men not merely for disloyal acts, but
for a disloyal heart, provided only that the disloyal heart was evidenced by some
utterance.”42 Convinced that the government had prosecuted the defendants for their
beliefs, not because of any danger they created through their actions, Brandeis noted that,
“to hold that such harmless additions to or omissions from news items, and such impotent
expressions of editorial opinion, as were shown here, can afford the basis even of a
prosecution, will doubtless discourage criticism of the policies of the government” and
create new threats to constitutional liberties.43 Brandeis ended his dissent in Schaefer
with this warning: “Men may differ widely as to what loyalty to our country demands,
and an intolerant majority, swayed by passion or by fear, may be prone in the future, as it
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has often been in the past, to stamp as disloyal opinions with which it disagrees.
Convictions such as these, besides abridging freedom of speech, threaten freedom of
thought and of belief."44 As he did in Gilbert, Brandeis in Pierce and Schaefer stressed
his concern for the protection of individual thought and expression against the power of
the state.
The dissents he wrote in Pierce and Schaefer revealed Brandeis’s commitment to
the clear and present danger test as a tool for protecting personal liberty, and Brandeis
clarified and strengthened that doctrine in subsequent opinions. Concurring in Whitney v.
California (1927), Brandeis developed the connection between the benefits of free speech
and the clear and present danger standard. Government suppression of speech, said
Brandeis, required that the speaker’s words create an imminent threat of serious evil. He
wrote that, “it is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.
To justify suppression of free speech, there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious
evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that
the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
evil to be prevented is a serious one.”45 Brandeis believed that if the threat of harm from
speech was not imminent, the remedy for the danger was more debate, not the
suppression of speech. Brandeis continued in Whitney by explaining that:
Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They
did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty.
To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and
fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government,
no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present unless the
incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before
there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through
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discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.
Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if
authority is to be reconciled with freedom. Such, in my opinion, is the
command of the Constitution. It is therefore always open to Americans to
challenge a law abridging free speech and assembly by showing that there
was no emergency justifying it.46
Despite their common support for the clear and present danger rule, significant
differences existed between Holmes and Brandeis over the protection of individual rights.
Holmes was less concerned about protecting individual rights against state power than
was Brandeis; in fact, Holmes viewed such rights with suspicion and disdain. Holmes
dissented in Progressive era cases like Lochner v. New York because he objected to the
Court’s interference with state power, not out of concern for individual liberty or a desire
to reform society.47 The idea that enforcement of individual rights might limit the power
of government troubled Holmes.48 In struggles between the state and the individual, the
needs and will of the state, according to Holmes, had, of necessity, to prevail. If the state
needed soldiers, he argued, it would conscript men and march them off to war, at bayonet
point if necessary.49 While Holmes and Brandeis often voted together in dissent against
decisions infringing the freedom of expression, they did so from different perspectives.
Holmes lamented the harm to the state that resulted from the suppression of dissenting
views. Such actions destroyed the marketplace of ideas on which a democratic society
depended. Holmes, who saw the courts more as dispassionate arbitrators between
competing interests, did not see the courts as champions of individual rights against the
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authority and power of society. Holmes maintained that the will of the majority should,
and in the end, inevitably would, prevail.50
This difference in perspectives between Holmes and Brandeis had important
ramifications for conscientious objectors whose cases came before the Court, as it had the
potential to lead to different conclusions about who should determine the extent of the
protection extended to rights of conscience—the legislature or the courts. Felix
Frankfurter, Dean of Harvard Law School and later Justice of the Supreme Court, joined
this debate and exerted significant influence over it. Frankfurter and Holmes were part of
the same social and academic circles, and as he did with Chafee and Hand, Holmes
corresponded with Frankfurter and valued his opinion. Like Holmes, Frankfurter
distrusted and disliked judicial intervention and rule making. Seeing the judiciary as the
branch of government least responsive to the will of the people, he advocated judicial
restraint. Even when legislative action infringed on the freedom of speech or privacy,
Frankfurter deferred to legislative initiative, believing that Congress and state legislatures
should remain free to define and pursue their own objectives without judicial
interference. Accordingly, he rejected the clear and present danger rule as being too
restrictive of government action. In Frankfurter’s view, legislatures required more
leeway to determine what forms of speech were dangerous and how to respond to
expressions of opinion that jeopardized the state’s interests.51
Frankfurter supported the protection of conscience, but unlike Brandeis, he did
not believe that it fell to the Courts to determine the nature or extent of that protection.
For example, Frankfurter saw it as the role of the strong, national state that emerged
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during World War I to define who would be excused from bearing arms and how they
would be treated. Jeremy Kessler explored this issue in "The Administrative Origins of
Modern Civil Liberties Law."52 Kessler argued that as a secretary in the War Department
during World War I Frankfurter promoted both a strong federal state and the lenient
treatment of conscientious objectors. According to Kessler, Frankfurter saw the two as
inextricably linked, with the government’s accommodation of conscience legitimizing its
expanding power. Kessler maintained that Frankfurter sought to increase civil rights
protections for conscientious objectors as a means of strengthening, rather than checking,
the government’s administrative power.53 Frankfurter pursued these goals by convincing
Secretary of War Newton Baker to issue an executive order expanding the definition of
conscientious objectors beyond the limits imposed by Congress in the conscription
statute.54 As enacted by Congress, the law excused from bearing arms only members of
historic peace churches. The statute, therefore, recognized only Quakers, Mennonites,
and members of the other recognized “peace” churches as conscientious objectors.
Frankfurter argued that this congressional exemption was far too narrow and would not
quell the strong opposition to the draft confronting the administration.55 His solution
involved expanding the definition of conscientious objection to include secular objectors
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who refused to fight solely on moral grounds and for the War Department to establish a
Board of Inquiry to evaluate the sincerity of each objector. In his War Department
memorandum, Frankfurter asserted that the treatment of conscientious objectors
undermined the nation’s democratic values. Frankfurter worried, said Kessler, that “by
treating [conscientious objectors] who refused to fight on religious, moral, or political
grounds as disobedient soldiers, the Act risked undermining their experience of selfdetermination. Categorized as subordinates who refused an order, not as citizens with
dissenting views about the common good, conscientious objectors would be shut out of
deliberation altogether; they would lack both the opportunity to express their normative
visions and the opportunity to have those visions subjected to reasoned correction.”56
Kessler described how Frankfurter hoped to balance concern for the protection of
conscience with his state-building goals by implementing a “novel administrative process
capable of acknowledging the individual conscientious objector’s views. In such a
scheme, rights of individual conscience functioned as occasions for the collective
construction of a pluralistic state.”57
As described by Kessler, Frankfurter’s vision of the relationship between civil
liberties and state power contained elements of both Brandeis’ and Holmes’ arguments
for the protection of ideas and speech. Brandeis’s emphasis on personal liberty was
evident in Frankfurter’s concern for protecting the right of individuals to formulate and
assert their own beliefs. So, too, was Holmes’s focus on state power and on the
importance of open debate and evaluation of ideas. Like Holmes, Frankfurter saw
protection of conscience as a means of legitimizing the government and promoting its
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growth and power. By expanding government protection and recognition of
conscientious objectors, he hoped to limit resistance to expanding federal power that
generated opposition to the war and conscription. Frankfurter shared the optimism of
Brandeis, Chafee, and Holmes, in his belief that the free exchange of ideas would lead to
correction or abandonment of erroneous ones and produce a more educated populace.
These goals drove Frankfurter’s policy decisions concerning conscientious objectors.
Frankfurter, however, maintained that the state, not the courts, should stand as the
protectors of conscience. During World War I, Frankfurter thrust the War Department
forward as both a builder of a powerful wartime state and as the protector of
conscientious objectors.58 Years later, as a member of the judiciary, Frankfurter argued
for judicial restraint in overturning actions by legislatures or administrative agencies. As
Kessler explained, Frankfurter was instrumental in promoting a theory for the protection
of civil liberties quite different from the one espoused by Brandeis. Instead of finding
protection of conscience in the language of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
Frankfurter contended that the limits of such protection were properly determined by the
state and that the courts should not interfere with that determination except in cases
where legislative or executive action lacked any reasonable basis. He rejected the clear
and present danger rule and the heightened scrutiny it applied to actions by the
government. Pointing to Holmes’s promotion of state power over individual rights and
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civil liberties, Frankfurter maintained that Holmes had not intended to rewrite the law
concerning speech in his famous World War I era opinions and dissents.59
By the 1930s, other members of the Court, sharing Brandeis’s commitment to
individual rights, disagreed with Frankfurter’s interpretation of Holmes’s clear and
present danger rule and pushed for rigorous judicial review of state action that impinged
on the basic rights and liberties contained in the first ten amendments to the United States
Constitution. Developing this philosophy, referred to as “Preferred Freedoms” or
“Preferred Position” doctrine, supporters argued that, in Abrams and its prodigy, Holmes
deliberately identified cases involving the freedoms of speech and conscience as proper
subjects for enhanced judicial scrutiny.60 Justice Benjamin Cardozo began shaping the
boundaries of the preferred freedoms doctrine in Palko v. Connecticut (1937).61 In Palko,
Cardozo identified certain basic freedoms recognized by the Bill of Rights and
considered so fundamental to “the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty” that they
were also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against infringement by the states.
Those rights included, said Cardoza, the freedoms of speech and thought guaranteed by
the First Amendment.62 “The belief that neither liberty nor Justice would exist if they
were sacrificed” required that those rights be incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment.63

59	
  Pritchett,	
  Civil	
  Liberties	
  and	
  the	
  Vinson	
  Court,	
  29.	
  
60	
  Ibid.,	
  32-‐36.	
  

61	
  Palko	
  v	
  Connecticut,	
  302	
  United	
  States	
  319	
  (1937).	
  
62	
  Ibid.,	
  326.	
  
63	
  Ibid.	
  

63

In footnote four of the Court’s decision in United States v. Carolene Products Co.
(1938), Justice Stone further described the shape of the preferred freedoms doctrine.64
The case involved a challenge to the regulatory power of Congress over the milk
industry. Upholding the power of Congress to ban certain products from the market, the
Court, adhering to Justice Frankfurter’s doctrine of judicial restraint and deference to
legislative decision-making, upheld the legislation in question without questioning the
motives or wisdom of Congress in adopting it. Stone, however, warned that the Court
would not so warmly receive legislation impinging on the fundamental rights identified
by Cardozo in Palko. Stone suggested that legislation impinging on the right to vote or on
the freedoms of speech and assembly would be “subjected to more exacting judicial
scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other
types of legislation.”65 Stone also indicated that legislation targeting specific religious or
ethnic groups—what he referred to as “discrete and insular minorities”—should also be
subject to a heightened level of judicial inquiry and review.66
In Thomas v. Collins (1945), a case involving the state’s ability to limit speech
and assembly, Justice Rutledge described the Court’s application of the preferred
freedoms doctrine as follows: “The case confronts us again with the duty our system
places on this Court to say where the individual's freedom ends and the State's power
begins. Choice on that border, now, as always, delicate, is perhaps more so where the
usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our
scheme to the great, the indispensable, democratic freedoms secured by the First
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Amendment.”67 Asserting the vibrancy of the preferred freedoms doctrine and the clear
and present danger test as stated by Holmes and developed by Brandeis, Rutledge wrote
that:
For these reasons, any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified
by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear
and present danger. The rational connection between the remedy provided
and the evil to be curbed, which, in other contexts, might support
legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These
rights rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion would
restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place,
must have clear support in public danger, actual or impending. Only the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for
permissible limitation. It is therefore in our tradition to allow the widest
room for discussion, the narrowest range for its restriction, particularly
when this right is exercised in conjunction with peaceable assembly.68
The Preferred Freedoms doctrine attracted powerful supporters, including Justices
Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, and Frank Murphy, who would build on Brandeis’
legacy of concern for individual rights. During the post World War II era, Douglas and
Murphy would author some of the Court’s strongest pronouncements in favor of the
protection of conscience. Their opinions and dissents in support of conscience and the
free expression of ideas often disclosed the same concern with and sympathy for personal
rights and dignity Justice Brandeis had expressed thirty years before. With Frankfurter
and his commitment to judicial restraint framing the other side of the issue, the debate
over the Court’s role in protecting claims of conscience continued into the post War
period and beyond. As World War II ended and the Cold War began, individuals
conscientiously opposed to participation in war, such as Larry Gara, would again find
themselves before the Court in cases defining the degree of protection the nation would
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afford to claims of conscience. In those post World War II cases, the Supreme Court
asserted itself as the primary protector of conscience. It did so by the justices forming
alliances on procedural issues that extended greater due process rights to COs. Notably
absent from those decisions was a consensus on the overarching ideological question of
why the protection of conscience mattered.
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Chapter 3
Becoming the Protector of Conscience: The Supreme Court and Cases involving
Conscientious Objectors following World War II
The Selective Service Act of 1940 led to the drafting of ten million men into the
armed forces of the United States during World War II.1 After the War ended, Congress
enacted a new conscription statute—the Universal Military Training and Selective
Service Act of 1948—to strength the nation’s defenses in light of fears that the Cold War
might soon turn hot. The Selective Service Act of 1948 inspired a new round of
opposition to the draft. While Larry Gara sat in jail waiting for his next court date, the
federal government was prosecuting approximately 100 other individuals for violating
that law. Most of the defendants in those cases were young men who openly refused to
register, mainly for religious reasons, though approximately ten-percent of this group
claimed no religious affiliation and objected to military service solely on ethical
grounds.2 The government pursued not only the young men refusing to register but also
those who supported and encouraged them. The Central Committee for Conscientious
Objectors reported that in Puerto Rico the government arrested members of the pacifist
Fellowship of Reconciliation for carrying signs encouraging young men not to register.3
In Kansas, the government filed charges against a physician, Warren A. Wirt, for
advising his son not to sign-up for the draft. Like Gara, the Kansas doctor informed
federal authorities of his actions by writing to the local United States Attorney. In his
letter, Dr. Wirt expressed his opposition to the draft and his intention to encourage young
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men like his son to disobey the law. Despite his father’s advice, Dr. Wirt’s son registered
with the Selective Service. The government, however, continued its prosecution of Dr.
Wirt. The court convicted him of encouraging and aiding disobedience of the draft laws
and sentenced him to two years in jail.4
The prosecutions under the Selective Service Acts of 1940 and 1948 of
individuals conscientiously opposed to military service generated a number of judicial
proceedings, some of which found their way to the United States Supreme Court. Many
of those cases involved procedural questions, such as how and when an individual could
challenge the decision of a local draft board that he did not meet the criteria for
classification as a conscientious objector. The cases also raised questions about the due
process rights of conscientious objectors and whether the procedures followed by draft
boards and the courts adequately protected those rights. The cases pitted the
constitutional claims of COs against the government’s need to populate the ranks of the
armed forces rapidly and efficiently.
These cases involving conscientious objectors, most of which were decided in the
decade following World War II, forced the Supreme Court to strike a balance between
the protection of conscience and the right of the nation to defend itself. In doing so,
members of the Court echoed arguments for the protection of speech and conscience
developed previously by Justices Holmes and Brandeis in the World War I era cases. In
the decisions on conscientious objection that followed World War II, some of the
Justices, particularly Justice Frank Murphy, displayed the same concern with the
protection of individual rights and dignity that Justice Brandeis had written about in
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Gilbert, Schaefer, and Whitney.5 Meanwhile, Justice Frankfurter continued to advocate
judicial restraint and objected to the Court’s creation of new rules and procedures that he
thought circumvented the conscription rules and procedures adopted by Congress.
Frankfurter maintained that Congress and the Selective Service System, not the Court,
should decide how and to what extent the nation protected claims of conscience. At the
same time, however, Justice Frankfurter displayed the same strong commitment to the
protection of conscience he had exhibited as a member of the Department of War during
World War I. In the tradition of Justice Holmes, Justice Frankfurter asserted that the
recognition and fair treatment of conscientious objectors legitimized state power and
thereby enhanced national security. These different perspectives merged in the post
World War II cases involving conscientious objectors. As with the World War I era
cases concerning the prosecutions of opponents of the draft under the Espionage and
Sedition Acts, these ideas were often developed in dissenting or concurring opinions. As
also happened in the World War I era cases, some of those minority opinions eventually
took hold and led to greater protection for claims of conscience.
This expansion of the protection afforded to claims of conscience occurred
primarily through the Court manipulating procedural rules that applied to COs, rather
than through the Court changing the substantive law governing exemption from military
service. For example, the Court in these cases did not question the premises underlying
the clear and present danger rule or its application. The Court continued to recognize that
when the nation’s security was threatened Congress possessed the power to adopt laws
designed to quickly and efficiently populate the ranks of the military. Adopting
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legislation for that purpose, Congress, said the Court, could infringe on claims of
conscience by limiting who qualified as a conscientious objector and by decreeing that
draft boards, not the courts, would determine if an individual should be classified as a
CO. The Court acknowledged that the clear and present danger rule allowed Congress to
restrict freedom of conscience during wartime in the same way it allowed restriction of
speech. While not questioning the limits Congress placed on claims of conscience, the
Court in the post World War II cases insisted, however, that decisions over who did and
who did not qualify as a conscientious objector comply with certain minimum standards
of due process. The Court articulated procedures for draft board hearings and ruled that
the results of those hearings were subject to judicial review. These procedural rules
imposed by the Court following World War II increased judicial protection of claims of
conscience, and they paved the way for later Supreme Court decisions that expanded the
substantive rights of COs as well.6
Most of the cases involving conscientious objectors that reached the Supreme
Court following World War II involved the statutory and administrative procedures COs
were forced to follow to secure exemption from military service. A conscientious
objector seeking exemption from military service faced a difficult path. Employing
basically the same definition of a conscientious objector as the 1940 statute, the Selective
Service Act of 1948 provided that “no person who, ‘by reason of religious training and
belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form,’ shall be required
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to undergo combatant training or service in the armed forces.”7 Consequently, draftees
seeking classification as conscientious objectors had to prove two things: that religious
training, not moral or secular beliefs, provided the basis for their objection; and that they
opposed all wars. These two requirements drew criticism from objectors and their
supporters since their adoption at the outset of World War I, because they offered no
protection or recourse to secular objectors.8 Individuals opposed to war solely on moral
grounds were forced to choose between service in the military and prison. Jehovah’s
Witnesses, on the other hand, found themselves ensnared by the second requirement—
that they oppose all war. While refusing to participate in all armed conflicts between
men, Jehovah’s Witnesses proclaimed their willingness to fight on God’s side in the
battle of Armageddon.9 The idiosyncratic views of Jehovah’s Witnesses about
participation in warfare coupled with their unique assertion that each male member of
their church was a minister and therefore exempt from conscription resulted in the
government prosecuting members of that sect for evading the draft. Many of the reported
decisions on conscientious objection involved Jehovah’s Witnesses.
A CO applicant had to convince his local draft board of his sincerity. If the local
board ruled against him, he could appeal. The Justice Department and FBI would then
investigate the applicant’s background and submit a recommendation to the appeals
board. The appeals board provided the applicant with a summary of the FBI report so
that he could respond. The CO applicant, however, was not entitled to review the reports
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from the Justice Department and the FBI, nor could he obtain the names of anyone who
provided information adverse to his claim.10 If the appeals board sustained the draft
board’s decision, the applicant confronted additional procedural difficulties. Judicial
opinions conflicted on some key issues. Basic questions, such as whether or not the
federal courts possessed jurisdiction to review the actions of draft boards at all, remained
unsettled. Many federal courts of appeal viewed draft board classifications as final and
not subject to judicial review. Even if some level of federal judicial review were
available, most federal courts held that an erroneous draft board ruling did not excuse the
draftee from reporting to the military for induction. Once he did so, the objector was
subject to military discipline and control. At that point, petitioning the appropriate
federal court for a writ of habeas corpus offered the only potential means of challenging
the board’s action.
The Supreme Court addressed these rules and procedures in the aftermath of
World War II. In cases dealing with conscientious objectors, the Supreme Court Justices
faced competing claims between protecting the nation and protecting conscience.
Limiting or eliminating judicial review of draft board decisions provided the best means
of quickly supplying soldiers to the military. A lack of judicial oversight concerning the
classification process, however, threatened to erode the nation’s long-standing
commitment to the protection of conscience. Where should the balance between the
protection of conscience and military preparedness be struck? And who should
determine that balance? These questions confronted the Court in the cases involving
COs. Though some of the procedural issues might have seemed trivial or mundane, they
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were not. They involved fundamental questions about the constitutional guarantees the
nation ostensibly extended to all of its citizens, as well as its commitment to protecting
the views of minority groups like conscientious objectors. The protection of conscience
for all Americans was the underlying issue at stake in the cases addressing the procedures
of the Selective Service.
The post World War II Supreme Court decisions concerning conscientious
objectors reflected a growing willingness of the Court to establish limits on the ability of
Congress to infringe on claims of conscience and an increasing recognition of the
important role the Court played in protecting minority groups and unpopular ideas against
the authority and power of the modern state. The cases also exhibited the Court’s
expansion of procedural rules designed to protect the due process rights of COs against
government encroachment. The Supreme Court extended that judicial protection to COs
slowly and cautiously. It did so in two ways. First, though the Court initially upheld
severe restrictions on an individual’s ability to seek judicial review of a draft board
decision finding that he failed to qualify as a conscientious objector, the Court did
eventually allow the federal courts to conduct a limited review of classification rulings by
the Selective Service Administration. Though narrow in scope, those reviews allowed the
Court to overturn decisions of draft boards that lacked evidentiary support and made the
Court the final arbiter in cases where COs sought exemption from military service.
Second, the Court mandated that draft boards and the Department of Justice follow
certain procedural rules in hearings involving conscientious objectors to safeguard the
due process rights of COs. For example, the Court became increasingly concerned that
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individuals denied recognition as conscientious objectors be informed of the evidence
against them and given a chance to respond.
The first case concerning judicial review of decisions by local draft boards
reached the Supreme Court before the end of World War II and addressed when and how
an individual could challenge a draft board’s decision as to whether or not he qualified as
a conscientious objector or for any other exemption to military service. In Falbo v.
United States (1944), the petitioner, a Jehovah’s Witness, argued that his draft board had
failed to recognize him as a minister of his church and instead had classified him as a
conscientious objector.11 He refused to report to a Civilian Public Service camp when the
board ordered him to do so. (If classified as a minister, Falbo would have been exempted
from both CPS and military service.) Arrested and charged with violating the Selective
Service Act, Falbo raised as a defense the draft board’s refusal to classify him as a
conscientious objector. He suggested that the board’s decision reflected the prejudice its
members felt toward him and his religion. Falbo quoted one of the board members as
having said, “I do not have any damned use for Jehovah’s Witnesses.”12 The Supreme
Court affirmed the District Court’s refusal to consider Falbo’s defense that the draft
board had misclassified him as a conscientious objector rather than as a minister. Writing
for the majority, Justice Hugo Black said that an individual could not challenge the draft
board’s decision until he reported for induction and was accepted for service by either the
military or CPS. Congress, observed Justice Black, had specifically provided that no
draftee could initiate a judicial review of a board decision until his induction process was
complete. Even a clearly erroneous ruling by the board regarding a draftee’s
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classification status did not excuse his failure to report for service.13 Since Falbo did not
report to CPS, he could not challenge the board’s refusal to classify him as a minister.
The Falbo decision significantly impacted conscientious objectors by confirming
that an individual whose claim for recognition as a CO was rejected by the draft board
must report for induction into the military before he could challenge the board’s decision
in court. After his induction, the objector could challenge the board’s ruling only by
filing a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. As Supreme Court Justice Frank Murphy
subsequently pointed out in Estep v. United States (1946), pursuing review of their draft
status through a writ of habeas corpus entailed unique risks and inconvenience for
conscientious objectors.14 Upon induction into the military, objectors immediately
became subject to military discipline. The military might move a CO thousands of miles
from his home, thereby separating him from his legal counsel and the witnesses who
could testify on his behalf. Aware of the mistreatment some conscientious objectors had
suffered in military prisons during World War I, COs were hesitant to subject themselves
to military control.15 Commenting on the difficulty of challenging a draft board
determination through the habeas corpus process, Justice Murphy noted objectors’ fears
of military authority by stating, “there is little assurance, moreover, that the military will
treat [their] efforts to obtain the writ with sympathetic understanding.”16 These inherent
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perils of the habeas corpus process imposed by the Court on conscientious objectors in
Falbo led Justice Murphy to comment that “these practical difficulties may thus destroy
whatever efficacy the remedy might otherwise have, and cast considerable doubt on the
assumption that habeas corpus proceedings necessarily guarantee due process of law to
inductees.”17
The question in Falbo was not whether or not the limited appeal process afforded
conscientious objectors by the Selective Service statutes and regulations abridged the
draftee’s rights to due process. The Court assumed that it did. The question from the
Court’s perspective was whether exigent circumstances facing the nation justified that
infringement. Did the needs of the nation warrant congressional and administrative
action limiting the rights of individuals who placed duty to conscience above duty to
country? To answer the question, the Court turned to the clear and present danger test
articulated by Justice Holmes in the famous World War I cases concerning the freedom
of speech and opposition to military service—Schenck, Frohwerk, Debs, and Abrams.18
The Court held in Falbo that the emergency confronting the nation on the eve of
World War II justified the severe limitations on judicial appeals included in the 1940
Selective Service Act. Writing for the majority, Justice Black pointed out that Congress
had needed to mobilize and arm the nation immediately. The nation, said Black, could
not afford to delay while large numbers of conscripts flooded the courts and argued that
their draft boards should have exempted them from service. Black wrote, “that dire
consequences might flow from apathy and delay was well understood. Accordingly the
[Conscription] Act was passed to mobilize national manpower with the speed which that
17	
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necessity and understanding required.”19 Congress had recognized a clear and present
danger and had acted appropriately to meet it. Because of that danger, the conscription
laws could require that an individual report for induction before any judicial review of his
draft classification occurred.
Justice Murphy dissented in Falbo, contending that neither legislative intent nor
defense of the nation necessitated curtailment of an individual’s right to a full judicial
review of the draft board’s action.20 Murphy maintained that denial of judicial review for
individuals refusing to report for service did nothing to enhance military preparedness,
since men who disregarded draft board orders were prosecuted and sent to jail; they did
not become part of the armed forces.21 Judicial review of those cases, in Murphy’s view,
did not delay the nation’s efforts to prepare for war. Accordingly, Murphy saw no clear
and present danger posed by extending judicial review to claims of conscientious
objection. Applying the clear and present danger standard, Murphy viewed the case, at
least in part, through the same lens as Justice Black. But Murphy added a new
perspective as well. Arguing for judicial review of draft board decisions, Murphy
stressed the importance of individual civil liberties in much the same way Justice
Brandeis had previously done in Gilbert and Schaefer, echoing Brandeis’s argument that
the protection of conscience was an integral part of the privileges and immunities
extended to all U.S. citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment.22 Murphy observed that
“individual rights have been recognized by our jurisprudence only after long and costly
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struggles. They should not be struck down by anything less than the gravest necessity.”23
Concerned that the conviction of Falbo may have resulted from wartime anxiety and
prejudice against Jehovah’s Witnesses and reflecting his commitment to the doctrine of
preferred freedoms, Murphy wrote, “The law knows no finer hour than when it cuts
through formal concepts and transitory emotions to protect unpopular citizens against
discrimination and persecution. I can perceive no other course for the law to take in this
case.”24
Black’s majority opinion and Murphy’s dissent in Falbo highlighted the different
intellectual legacies of Holmes and Brandeis on the issue of conscience and how those
differences manifested themselves. Despite his support for the concept of preferred
freedoms and his commitment to judicial protection of civil liberties, Black, echoing
Holmes, viewed the Falbo case from the perspective of the government and its power and
responsibility to defend the nation. Holmes had approached the protection of speech and
conscience from the same viewpoint in the post World War I cases. As discussed in
Chapter 2, Holmes, and his protégé Felix Frankfurter, saw the protection of speech and
conscience as ultimately strengthening the power and legitimacy of the state. Holmes had
expressed no doubt that individual rights must yield to state authority, especially in times
of crisis. For Black, the crucial question in Falbo was if a clear and present danger
existed when Congress elected to curtail judicial review of draft board decisions. Once
he determined that Congress had indeed confronted an emergency, his approval of the
conscription legislation and its abbreviated review procedures followed. The case then
became one of statutory construction: Had Congress in the conscription statute authorized
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judicial review of draft board rulings before the induction process was complete?
Finding no evidence that Congress had created such a remedy, Black noted that, “Surely,
if Congress had intended to authorize interference with that process by intermediate
challenges of orders to report, it would have said so.”25 In addition, with its focus on the
technical aspects of the procedures enumerated in the Selective Service statutes, Black’s
opinion in Falbo served as a harbinger of the new direction the Court eventually followed
in protecting claims of conscience. Rather than pursue an ideological consensus over how
and why conscience should be protected, the justices instead turned to the strict
enforcement of technical rules governing the classification process.26
Justice Murphy, on the other hand, in his dissent refused to abandon or deviate
from the rationale offered by Justice Brandeis for the protection of speech and
conscience—that those rights insure the ability of individuals to participate fully in
American society. Murphy’s dissent in Falbo demonstrated the connection between the
emphasis Brandeis placed on individual rights and the Preferred Freedoms doctrine. An
adherent of the idea that legislation infringing on the rights guaranteed by the first Ten
Amendments to the Constitution must be subjected to a heightened level of judicial
scrutiny, Murphy concluded that excluding COs from the courts constituted an
unwarranted infringement on fundamental civil liberties of the individual.27 Emphasizing
the need to safeguard individual liberty threatened by government power, Murphy’s
analysis of Falbo differed sharply from the views of Justice Black. The different
perspectives from which Black and Murphy approached the case led them to different
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conclusions about how much government interference with personal liberty the Court
should tolerate in order to allow the nation to defend itself.
The views espoused by Justice Murphy regarding the procedural aspects of
conscription cases involving CO’s gained some traction on the Court following the end of
World War II. In Estep v. United States (1946), the Supreme Court considered issues
similar to those in Falbo.28 As in Falbo, the defendant in Estep was a Jehovah’s Witness.
He claimed that he served as a minister in his church and that he therefore was exempt
from military conscription. The draft board rejected his petition for designation as a
minister and as a conscientious objector and ordered Estep to report for induction into the
military. Estep went to the induction center but refused to take the oath and enter the
armed services. Prosecuted for violating the Selective Service Act, Estep at his trial
moved to assert as a defense the draft board’s failure to classify him as a minister exempt
from military and civilian service. The Supreme Court held that he could raise that
defense. Distinguishing Falbo, where the defendant had refused to appear at the CPS
camp as the draft board had ordered, the Court held that Estep had complied with all
conditions precedent to challenging the board’s classification decision by appearing at the
induction center but refusing to take the oath.29 The Court ruled that Estep remained
outside of the military and therefore was not subject to military discipline. That meant
that he was not forced to contest the board’s decision by filing a writ of habeas corpus.30
Instead, he could wait until the government filed charges against him in federal court and
then defend that action based on the board’s refusal to recognize him as a minister and
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conscientious objector.31 Nearly all federal Courts of Appeal had previously treated the
draft board decisions as final orders that were not subject to any judicial review.32 Now,
Estep and other conscientious objectors could seek review of their draft status in federal
court.33 Conscientious objectors still found themselves in a precarious position, however.
COs had to follow a specific procedural path to protect their judicial rights and avoid
becoming subject to military jurisdiction. An objector who intended to challenge the
draft board’s decision as to his classification had to appear at the induction center, but it
was imperative that he announce his refusal to join the military and not take the induction
oath.
In Estep, the Supreme Court inserted itself as a protector of conscience by adding
a layer of judicial review to the administrative appeal process specified in the Selective
Service Act. The case was a significant victory for COs, in that it allowed them to avoid
entanglement with the military justice system and pursue their claims in federal court.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Estep thereby ameliorated some the harshest aspects of
the rule enunciated in Falbo. The Court drew inspiration from Justice Murphy’s
insistence in Falbo that respect for individual liberties and dignity required judicial
review of rulings by draft boards. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas maintained
that Congress could not place all actions by draft boards beyond the purview of the
courts. Orders that discriminated against a particular ethnic group, for example,
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exceeded the board’s authority and could be invalidated by judicial action.34 Citing
concerns for personal liberty and the protection of conscience voiced a generation before
by Justice Brandeis, Douglas wrote that, “we cannot read § 11 [of the Selective Service
Act] as requiring the courts to inflict punishment on registrants for violating whatever
orders the local boards might issue. We cannot believe that Congress intended that
criminal sanctions were to be applied to orders issued by local boards no matter how
flagrantly they violated the rules and regulations defining their jurisdiction.” Douglas
noted that fundamental rights and freedoms were at stake. “We are dealing here with a
question of personal liberty,” he wrote. “A registrant who violates the Act commits a
felony. A felon customarily suffers the loss of substantial rights.”35 With its attention to
fundamental rights and freedoms, the Court’s decision in Estep reflected the growing
influence of the Preferred Freedoms doctrine. Cutting off the access of conscientious
objectors to the Courts, Congress had, in Douglas’s view, trampled on basic freedoms
embodied in the Constitution. Douglas refused to condone such legislative action
without rigorous judicial scrutiny. As his opinion makes clear, Douglas believed there
were limits beyond which Congressional power could not extend. Cases involving
conscientious objectors forced the Court to consider those boundaries. In Estep, the
Court concluded that shielding draft board decisions from all judicial review, particularly
when they involved claims of conscience, was unconstitutional.
Justice Murphy filed a separate concurring opinion in Estep. He noted the
nation’s interest in building its armed forces through conscription. At the same time, he
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asserted that even the exigent circumstances facing the country during times of war did
not justify the sacrifice of personal liberty. Murphy wrote:
We must be cognizant of the fact that we are dealing here with a
legislative measure born of the cataclysm of war, which necessitates many
temporary restrictions on personal liberty and freedom. But the war power
is not a blank check to be used in blind disregard of all the individual
rights which we have struggled so long to recognize and preserve. It must
be used with discretion, and with a sense of proportionate values. In this
instance, it seems highly improbable that the war effort necessitates the
destruction of the right of a person charged with a crime to obtain a
complete review and consideration of his defense. As long as courts are
open and functioning, judicial review is not expendable.36
Murphy filed a separate opinion in Estep to reiterate his views on where the Court should
strike a balance between military preparedness and the protection of conscience. From
his perspective, the need to conscript soldiers quickly and efficiently did not justify
stripping COs of the opportunity to seek judicial review of administrative decisions made
by their draft boards.
Justice Frankfurter concurred with the result in Estep on technical grounds,
because he believed that the trial judge had improperly and incorrectly told the jury that
Estep had not appeared at the induction center. On that basis alone, Frankfurter agreed
with the result.37 But he strongly objected to the Court allowing for even a limited
review of decisions by draft boards. Congress intended, said Frankfurter, that all draft
board rulings be final and that the courts should not upset decisions made by the
Selective Service.38 With the security of the nation at stake, Frankfurter argued,
Congress possessed the exclusive authority to strike a balance between military
preparedness and the protection of conscience. Congress, wrote Frankfurter, had
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determined that the need to process conscripts quickly necessitated the truncated review
procedures in the Selective Service Act. He observed that, “Congress deemed it
imperative to secure a vast citizen army with the utmost expedition. It did so with due
regard for the individual interests by giving ample opportunities, within the elaborate
system which it established, for supervision of the decisions of the multitudinous draft
boards on the selection of individuals for service.”39 Frankfurter argued that the Court
should not frustrate the intent of Congress by allowing the courts to review draft board
decisions and thereby slow down the induction process. Commenting on the provisions
of the Selective Service Act, Frankfurter wrote that, “even were the language not explicit,
every provision of the Act should be construed to promote fulfillment of the imperative
need which inspired it. Surely it would hamper the aim of Congress to subject the
decisions of the selective process in determining who is amenable to service to
reconsideration by the cumbersome process of trial by jury, admirably suited as that is for
the familiar controversies when the nation's life is not at stake.”40 Congress had
determined that judicial review was inconsistent with the state’s need to raise an army
quickly. The philosophy of judicial restraint espoused by Frankfurter required that the
Court respect that decision. In Frankfurter’s opinion, the word of Congress should have
been final, and the identification and protection of conscientious objectors should have
been left exclusively to the Selective Service. As was the case with his actions dealing
with COs while a member of the War Department during World War I, Frankfurter’s
attention focused on building and maintaining the federal power necessary to defend the
nation. The protection of conscience could be, and should be, accommodated only to the
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extent it did not imperil that paramount goal. As Holmes had done before him,
Frankfurter saw the protection of conscience as auxiliary to the development of state
power.
Even though the Supreme Court in Estep created a larger role for the courts in
reviewing the classification of conscientious objectors, judicial review of draft board
rulings remained a limited one. The Court addressed this issue in Cox v. United States
(1947). The case again involved Jehovah’s Witnesses who claimed that their draft boards
had erred by not recognizing them as ministers exempt from both military duty and
alternative service in CPS. Having classified three men as COs, the draft boards ordered
them to report to CPS camps. The three defendants did so, but later left the camps
without permission. Prosecuted for being absent from the camps, the defendants asked
the courts to overturn the decisions of their draft boards and classify them as ministers.
The district courts that heard the cases looked only at the evidence before the draft boards
and, having found at least some evidence supporting the boards’ rulings, upheld their
decisions.41 When the case reached the Supreme Court, a majority of the Justices
followed the same approach as the district courts and held that draft board decisions must
be affirmed if the board’s file contained any evidence supporting its decision, even if
other evidence suggested that the board’s determination was erroneous.42 Writing for the
majority, Justice Stanley Reed explained that “this standard of review means that the
courts are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether the classification made by the
local boards was justified. The decisions of the local boards made in conformity with the
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regulations are final even though they may be erroneous.”43 He continued, stating that,
“Perhaps a court or jury would reach a different result from the evidence, but, as the
determination of classification is for selective service, its order is reviewable "only if
there is no basis in fact for the classification. * * * Consequently, when a court finds a
basis in the file for the board's action, that action is conclusive.”44 Finding a factual basis
for the decisions of the draft boards in the file pertaining to each defendant in Cox, the
Court upheld their convictions.
The Cox decision fueled the controversy among the members of the Court
concerning its role in protecting claims of conscience. For Justice Murphy, who
dissented with Justice Rutledge, the Court exhibited far too much deference to draft board
decisions given the individual rights and liberties at stake. He argued for a more robust
judicial review, one that would require the Court to find substantial evidence, not merely
any evidence, supporting the draft board’s decision in order to confirm it.45 For Justice
Murphy, the prosecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses claiming exemption from military
service as conscientious objectors and ministers differed substantially from civil
proceedings in which the court reviewed the validity of administrative orders. Murphy
implied that a lower standard of review was appropriate in civil cases, since those matters
were “unrelated to freedom of conscience or religion.”46 The prosecution of Cox and the
other defendants was a criminal trial concerning “administrative action denying that the
defendant has conscientious or religious scruples against war, or that he is a minister. His
liberty and his reputation depend upon the validity of that action. If the draft board
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classification is held valid, he will be imprisoned or fined, and will be branded as a
violator of the nation's law; if that classification is unlawful, he is a free man.”47 Murphy
contended that, “since guilt or innocence centers on that classification, its validity should
be established by something more forceful than a wisp of evidence or a speculative
inference.” Murphy asserted that “such a scant foundation should not justify brushing
aside bona fide claims of conscientious belief or ministerial status. If respect for human
dignity means anything, only evidence of a substantial nature warrants approval of the
draft board classification in a criminal proceeding.”48
Douglas also wrote a dissenting opinion in Cox, in which Black joined. Douglas
did not object to the standard of review adopted by the Court, but he argued that even
those minimum requirements—that there be at least some evidence supporting the
board’s decision not to classify the defendants as ministers—were not satisfied in this
case. Douglas reviewed the Selective Service regulations defining ministers of religion
and concluded that the defendants in Cox met that description. The board should have
recognized them as such, he concluded. The board’s failure to do so, in Douglas’s view,
could only have resulted from confusion over and perhaps prejudice towards the unique
structure and religious views and practices of Jehovah’s Witnesses.49 They qualified for
the exemption, said Douglas, even though they “follow[ed] less orthodox or conventional
practices.”50 The dissent written by Douglas disclosed the uncertainty and ambiguity
created by even the limited judicial review process described in Estep and Cox.
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Reviewing the same record, a majority of the justices concluded that the ruling of the
draft board should be confirmed, while Douglas and Black voted to reverse it.
Like Falbo and Estep, the decision in Cox highlighted differences on the Court
over the protection of conscience. That division on the Court arose from the different
perspectives and reasons for the protection of conscience offered by Holmes and
Brandeis in the post World War I cases. On the one hand, Justice Reed and the four
Justices joining his majority opinion believed that state power trumped the due process
concerns of conscientious objectors. For them, the military needs of the state on the
verge of war outweighed the importance of protecting individual rights. Congress had
identified a clear and present danger and had acted to address it. The majority exhibited
no desire or willingness to question the methods or motivations of Congress under those
circumstances. Their focus on maintaining the power and integrity of the state found
support in the reasoning of Holmes in his famous dissents, where he argued that the
ultimate purpose of free speech was to enhance the state’s legitimacy and strength
through the free exchange of ideas. When the expression of ideas imperiled the state,
freedom of speech and conscience had to yield, in Holmes’s view, to the protection of the
nation. The majority opinion in Cox also drew from Justice Frankfurter’s philosophy of
judicial restraint by deferring to Congressional action on matters of national defense,
even though such action impinged on such fundamental liberties as the freedom of
conscience.51
The dissenting Justices, on the other hand, stressed their concern with protecting
the basic privileges and immunities of conscientious objectors as citizens of the United
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States. Like Justice Brandeis before them, they addressed the issue from the perspective
of the individuals whose rights were abridged by congressional action. As the comments
of Justice Douglas in Cox revealed, they worried that the unorthodox views of COs made
them easy targets of discrimination. The dissenters acknowledged that the nation had
faced clear and present dangers when Congress enacted the Selective Service Act.
Nonetheless, as proponents of the doctrine of preferred freedoms, they felt obligated to
scrutinize the actions of Congress, particularly where legislative action encroached on the
freedom of conscience. In cases involving a preferred freedom such as the protection of
conscience, the dissenters opposed the judicial restraint and deference to Congressional
and administrative action espoused by Justice Frankfurter. Cox displayed the tension
between the competing judicial philosophies of preferred freedoms and judicial restraint.
The case illustrated the different opinions and results that arose from those different
perspectives.
While the decision in Cox limited the Court’s role in reviewing draft board
rulings, it did not eliminate all judicial oversight of the conscription process. Instead,
based on the holding in Estep, the Court had given itself the final say regarding claims
over exemption from military service. That became apparent six years later when the
Court decided Dickenson v. United States (1953). In Dickenson, the Court overruled the
draft board’s determination that the defendant, a Jehovah’s Witness, did not meet the
criteria for exemption as a minister.52 According to Justice Tom Clark, who wrote the
decision in Dickenson, the record included no evidence contradicting the defendant’s
claim that he worked fulltime as a minister and therefore qualified for the exemption. The
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draft board denied Dickenson’s claim for a ministerial exemption because of his youth,
the short period of time during which he had served as a minister, and because he also
worked a few hours each week as a radio repairman to support himself. Clark asserted
that the draft board’s skepticism about Dickenson’s claim emanated from speculation, not
facts.53 Overruling the draft board’s denial of Dickenson’s claim, Clark wrote that, “the
courts may properly insist that there be some proof that is incompatible with the
registrant's proof of exemption.”54 Justice Clark concluded that, “when the
uncontroverted evidence supporting a registrant's claim places him prima facie within the
statutory exemption, dismissal of the claim solely on the basis of suspicion and
speculation is both contrary to the spirit of the Act and foreign to our concepts of
justice.”55
The decision of the Court in Dickenson exhibited a new approach to the
protection of conscience. Justice Clark based his opinion on limited, procedural grounds.
He reiterated that the role of the Court in reviewing decisions by the draft board was, at
least ostensibly, a limited one. The Court would not independently review the facts and
form its own conclusion, said Clark, and he confirmed that the Court would intervene
only if it found no evidentiary basis at all for the classification ruling made by the draft
board.56 In the decision rendered by the Court in Dickenson, Clark included none of the
soaring rhetoric about why the protection of conscience mattered found in previous
opinions and dissents authored by Justices Brandeis. Douglas, and Murphy. Clark did not
refer to or rely on the doctrine of preferred freedoms or subject actions taken by Congress
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to an enhanced level of scrutiny even if they threatened to impinge on freedoms
guaranteed by the First Amendment. Instead, he crafted a narrow opinion focused on
procedural issues that purported to respect the jurisdictional limits imposed on the courts
by Congress in the Selective Service Act of 1948. But despite the restrained language
and nod to judicial restraint, the result in Dickenson testified to the power and extent of
the rule first enunciated in Estep—that the courts could invalidate decisions by draft
boards when the record disclosed no factual support for the board’s ruling. In Dickenson,
the Court signaled its willingness to use that power to advance the protection of
conscience. The Court might have deferred to the judgment of the draft board and
respected the inferences it had drawn from the demeanor of Dickenson and from the
circumstances of his case. Instead, the Court construed the record narrowly, giving
Dickenson the benefit of the doubt and found no factual basis for the decision. The rule
of Estep, as applied in Dickenson, meant that the Court had the final say over who did
and who did not qualify for exemption from military service. That shift left the Court,
not Congress or the draft boards, as the ultimate protector of conscience.
Three Justices, Robert H. Jackson, Harold Hitz Burton, and Sherman Minton,
dissented in Dickenson. They objected to the Court overriding the judgment of the draft
board. The Court, observed the dissenters, had adopted a rule that made it more difficult
for the Selective Service apparatus to function. In their view, the Court’s review of
classification rulings forced the boards to spend more time documenting files and
explaining their decisions in order to guard against judicial attack. That, noted the
dissenters, distracted the boards from their primary duty of providing manpower for
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defense of the nation.57 Commenting on what they saw as a contradiction between the
limited scope of review espoused by the Court in Estep and the bold action of the Court
in Dickenson, the three dissenters wrote that:
The problem inherent in Estep and raised by the majority opinion today is
what is required of the board under such circumstances? It will not do for
the Court as in Estep to say, on the one hand, that the board's action is not
subject to "the customary scope of judicial review," and that "the courts
are not to weigh the evidence," and then, on the other, to strike down a
classification because no affirmative evidence supporting the board's
conclusion appears in the record. Under today's decision, it is not
sufficient that the board disbelieve the registrant. The board must find and
record affirmative evidence that he has misrepresented his case -- evidence
which is then put to the test of substantiality by the courts. In short, the
board must build a record.58
For the dissenters, the Court exhibited too much concern in Dickenson for the civil
liberties of conscientious objectors. The dissenters argued that the Court had undermined
the intention of Congress that Selective Service boards, not the courts, determine the
classification status of draftees.
In addition to establishing judicial review of decisions made by draft boards, the
Supreme Court also expanded its role in protecting COs by requiring that appeals from
draft board hearings meet certain minimal standards of due process. The changes the
court imposed were not dramatic. In fact, the Court affirmed existing procedures and
imposed no new requirements. But the Court’s insistence that the Department of Justice
and the Selective Service follow existing procedures and insure that applicants denied
recognition as COs have a meaningful opportunity to address evidence against them
constituted an important step forward in the protection of conscience.
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The main issue involved the right of an objector to access FBI records concerning
his case. The Court initially did no more than confirm that an applicant was entitled only
to a summary of the reports in his file, not to inspect the contents of the file. The Court
insisted, however, that the summaries be accurate and provide the applicant with an
opportunity to address evidence adverse to his claim. While not expanding the rights of
COs to inspect information in FBI and draft board files, the Court’s increasing concern
with the fairness of hearings before the Department of Justice and local appeals boards
marked an important step forward for the protection of conscience. As with the issue of
judicial review, a dissenting opinion drove the Court’s increased sensitivity to due
process concerns. In this case, that dissent was written by Justice Frankfurter.
The cases involving conscientious objection that followed World War II revealed
the complexity of Justice Frankfurter’s perspective on conscientious objection. During
World War I, Frankfurter used his position as a member of the War Department to
increase the scope of government protection for COs during World War I.59 Frankfurter
believed that acknowledging claims of conscience increased the legitimacy of the
government actions concerning military conscription and paved the way for establishing
a powerful centralized state.60 Though he considered it the job of Congress to determine
the extent to which the nation should accommodate claims of conscience, he also
maintained that acts of Congress should be interpreted to grant more, rather than less,
protection to conscientious objectors.
Frankfurter’s dissent in United States v. Nugent (1953) showed how he
maintained this perspective on the connection between state power and the protection of
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conscience as a member of the Supreme Court.61 Like most of the cases on conscientious
objection reviewed by the Supreme Court, Nugent involved procedural questions about
the appeal process an applicant for CO status under the Selective Service Act 1948 had to
follow if his local draft board denied his claim and deemed him available for military
service. If the draft board rejected his application to be designated as a conscientious
objector, the applicant could file a claim with the appeals board. That agency then
referred the matter to the Department of Justice, and the FBI would conduct an
investigation of the applicant’s claim. After interviewing the applicant and people who
knew him, the FBI issued a report to the Department of Justice. The Department of
Justice provided the applicant and his counsel with a summary of the FBI report but did
not allow him to inspect it. The Department of Justice then conducted a hearing. The
applicant and his counsel attended the hearing and could respond to the contents of the
FBI report as it had been summarized for them by the Department of Justice. The
Department of Justice then submitted a recommendation to the appeals board, suggesting
either that the applicant’s claim be allowed or rejected.62 Nugent challenged this
procedure, contending that it was unconstitutional. He argued that the Department of
Justice infringed his due process rights and his right to confront adverse witnesses by
denying him access to the FBI report. The Supreme Court denied Nugent’s challenge to
the review procedures of the Department of Justice, rejecting his assertion that he was
entitled to review the FBI report concerning his case.
Chief Justice Fred Vinson wrote the majority opinion in Nugent. Recognizing, as
the Court had done in Falbo, that questions concerning the procedural aspects of appeals
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from draft board rulings involved balancing individual liberty against the need to raise an
army, the Court held that by denying Nugent access to the FBI files and the names of
witnesses the Department of Justice did not violate his constitutional rights. The majority
of the Justices accepted the balance between the protection of conscience and military
preparedness struck by Congress in the Selective Service Act of 1948. Vinson
commented on that balance, noting that, “it is always difficult to devise procedures which
will be adequate to do justice in cases where the sincerity of another's religious
convictions is the ultimate factual issue. It is especially difficult when these procedures
must be geared to meet the imperative needs of mobilization and national vigilance -when there is no time for "litigious interruptions. [Citing Falbo.] Under the
circumstances presented, we cannot hold that the statute, as we construe it, violates the
Constitution.”63
Dissenting in Nugent, Justice Frankfurter disagreed with the majority’s
interpretation of the Selective Service Act. He argued that the Court should construe the
statute as providing both the appeals board and the applicant full access to the
Department of Justice file. Frankfurter noted the country’s long-standing respect for
claims of conscience. He wrote that, “considering the traditionally high respect that
dissent, and particularly religious dissent, has enjoyed in our view of a free society, this
Court ought not to reject a construction of congressional language which assures justice
in cases where the sincerity of another's religious conviction is at stake, and where prison
may be the alternative to an abandonment of conscience. The enemy is not yet so near the
gate that we should allow respect for traditions of fairness, which has heretofore
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prevailed in this country, to be overborne by military exigencies.”64 In Frankfurter’s
view, the military dangers confronting the nation as a result of the Cold War did not merit
curtailing the due process rights of applicants by denying them access to the FBI files.
Though not a proponent of the clear and present danger test, Frankfurter invoked that
standard in Nugent, arguing that the need to protect the state by bolstering the armed
forces did not warrant the administrative restriction on review of the FBI reports and the
concomitant infringement of civil liberties. As he had done during World War I,
Frankfurter argued that commitment to the protection of conscience strengthened the
nation, observing that, “in a country with our moral and material strength, the
maintenance of fair procedures cannot handicap our security. Every adherence to our
moral professions reinforces our strength and therefore our security.”65 Like the majority,
Frankfurter’s paramount concern was protection of the nation. Unlike the majority,
however, Frankfurter believed that goal was best achieved by bolstering the
administrative protection of conscience, rather than by restricting it. He believed that
goal could be achieved in Nugent without undermining Congressional intent. In Nugent,
Frankfurter presented an argument for the protection of conscience similar to the one
developed by Holmes in Abrams—that tolerance of dissenting creeds and ideas
strengthened the nation and increased its security.66

64	
  Ibid.,	
  12-‐13.	
  
65	
  Ibid.,	
  13.	
  
66

Justice Douglas and Justice Black joined the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter. Justice Douglas
also wrote a separate opinion in which he argued for identification of the witnesses named in the FBI
report. Douglas contended that, “without the identity of the informer, the person investigated or accused
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As Justice Murphy’s dissent in Falbo had done, Frankfurter’s dissent in Nugent
pushed the Court in new directions, as the review process of the Selective Service
Administration became the subject of greater scrutiny. In Simmons v. United States
(1955), the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a conscientious objector for failing
to submit to induction. The Court held that the Department of Justice had violated the
Selective Service Act of 1948 and the defendant’s constitutional rights by failing to
provide him with a fair summary of the FBI report.67 Justice Tom C. Clark distinguished
Simmons from the ruling in Nugent. The holding in Nugent that the Department of
Justice need not give a copy of the FBI report to the applicant was premised, wrote Clark,
on the assumption that the Department of Justice would at least provide the applicant
with a fair summary of the FBI’s conclusions. Clark held that Congress mandated that the
Department of Justice provide such a report to the applicant. The Court also held that an
applicant must be informed of the FBI’s conclusions and be given a chance to respond at
the Department of Justice hearing in order to satisfy the minimum requirements of due
process.68 The Supreme Court reached a similar result in Gonzales v. United States
(1955), in which the Court held that the failure of the appeals board to provide the
defendant with a copy of the recommendation issued by the Department of Justice
violated his right to due process.69 Justice Clark again wrote the opinion of the Court.
The reasoning of Nugent, said Clark, dictated that the appeals board mail a copy of the
Department of Justice recommendation to the applicant and allow him to respond.70 By
holding in Nugent that the Department of Justice could deny conscientious objectors
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access to FBI files, the Court had accepted limitations on the procedural rights of COs.
Simmons and Gonzales, on the other hand, made clear that the Court refused to condone
any action that went further and effectively eliminated the right of objectors to learn of
and respond to evidence against them.
As in Dickenson, the decisions in Simmons and Gonzales were narrow in scope
and focused on procedural details rather than on ideological debates over the doctrine of
preferred freedoms versus the practice of judicial restraint. But, as in Dickenson, the
Court also made it clear in Simmons and Gonzales that it had the final say on issues
involving claims of conscience, including whether draft board and Justice Department
hearings complied with the requirements of due process. In those post World War II
cases involving the procedural due process rights of conscientious objectors, the Supreme
Court continued its quest to reconcile the desire of Congress that a large military force be
assembled promptly and efficiently with the protection of personal liberty and human
dignity. Noting the fine line the Court walked between those competing interests, Justice
Clark observed in Simmons that:
We are now dealing with constitutional limitations. We are endeavoring to
apply a procedure, set forth by Congress, in accordance with the statutory
plan and the concepts of basic fairness which underlie all our legislation.
We have held that, to meet its duty under § 6(j), the Department must
furnish the registrant with a fair resume of the FBI report. It is clear in the
circumstances of this case that it has failed to do so, and that petitioner has
thereby been deprived of an opportunity to answer the charges against
him. This is not an incidental infringement of technical rights. Petitioner
has been deprived of the fair hearing required by the Act, a fundamental
safeguard, and he need not specify the precise manner in which he would
have used this right -- and how such use would have aided his cause -- in
order to complain of the deprivation. 71
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Simmons, and Gonzales found proponents of the two different rationales for the
protection of conscience together on the same side. The cases turned on an odd alliance
between Frankfurter—the leading proponent of judicial restraint—and Douglas and
Black—advocates of the Preferred Freedoms doctrine. Neither side won support from
the other for its judicial philosophy. Black and Douglas did not abandon their belief that
the courts should carefully scrutinize congressional and administrative actions infringing
basic constitutional liberties such as the right of conscience, while Frankfurter continued
to maintain that the courts should uphold all congressional and administrative decisions
except those lacking any reasonable justification. Instead, the decisions of the Supreme
Court in Simmons, and Gonzales emerged from Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter focusing
and agreeing on procedural questions. Frankfurter opened the door for this comprise
when he concluded in his dissent in Nugent that Congress intended that draft boards and
the Department of Justice follow the procedural safeguards outlined by the Court in
Simmons and Gonzales. The evolution of the law concerning conscientious objectors
evident in Nugent, Simmons, and Gonzales demonstrated how members of the Court
increased the scope of individual rights such as the freedom of conscience by agreeing on
the extension of procedural safeguards, even though significant differences existed
among the justices over the ideological foundations of their decisions.
The cases on conscientious objection decided by the Supreme Court in the
aftermath of World War II established three important things: First, that administrative
hearings within the Department of Justice and the Selective Service system had to
comply with minimal standards of due process; second, that draft board decisions were
subject to judicial review; and third, that decisions by the draft boards must be based on
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evidence and could not be arbitrary or capricious. In those cases, the Court interposed
itself as the ultimate protector of conscience and refused to relinquish that role to
Congress or to the Selective Service Administration. As these cases indicate, the Court
did so primarily by imposing procedural safeguards on which members of the different
factions of the Court could agree. The debate over the broader substantive issues
commenced by Holmes and Brandeis in the post World War I cases remained unresolved.
Procedural questions that arose in the post World War II cases provided a means for the
Court to extend the protection of conscience without confronting bigger, philosophical
issues. The post World War II cases did not resolve the overarching debate over where
and why the Court should draw the line between the protection of conscience and
government power.
The post World War II cases did, however, pave the way for the Supreme Court
to address broader, more fundamental issues concerning COs and the protection of
conscience. In Sicurella v. United States (1955), the Court became involved in defining
who qualified as a conscientious objector.72 The draft board had refused to classify
Sicurella, a Jehovah’s Witness, as a CO because of his express willingness to fight in
theocratic wars. When Sicurella appealed, the Department of Justice recommended that
the appeals board deny his claim, reasoning that since Sicurella did not oppose all forms
of warfare he did not meet the statutory definition of a conscientious objector provided by
Congress.73 The Supreme Court overruled the decision of the draft board and directed
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that Sicurella be recognized as a conscientious objector.74 The Court concluded that
Congress had not intended to deny exemptions from military service to objectors
willingly to conduct only theocratic battle. Writing for the Court, Justice Clark observed
“that Congress had in mind real shooting wars when it referred to participation in war in
any form -- actual military conflicts between nations of the earth in our time -- wars with
bombs and bullets, tanks, planes, and rockets. We believe the reasoning of the
Government in denying petitioner's claim is so far removed from any possible
congressional intent that it is erroneous as a matter of law.”75 With its decision in
Sicurella, the Court had parlayed its limited power to review draft board decisions
established in Estep into the authority to dictate who should and who should not be
designated as a conscientious objector. The Sicurellla decision served as additional
evidence that the Supreme Court had assumed the role of being the primary protector of
conscience.
The Sicurella case was one of the disputes over conscription generated by the
Cold War and the conflict in Korea. Ten years later, the war in Vietnam brought a new
wave of cases involving COs before the Court. The Court picked up where it left off and
once again determined who qualified as a conscientious objector. In Seeger v. United
States (1965), the Court held that secular objectors—individuals opposed to participation
solely on moral rather on religious grounds—must be recognized as conscientious
objectors.76 Seeger represented a major victory for conscientious objectors. Justice Clark
again wrote the majority opinion, crafting another narrow decision that purported to do
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no more than interpret the conscription statute. Yet, given the topic, the language Clark
employed could not help but echo the same concern with the sanctity of personal beliefs
and dignity Brandeis had addressed in the World War I era cases. Clark wrote that as to
secular objectors the controlling question was “whether a given belief that is sincere and
meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the
orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where such
beliefs have parallel positions in the lives of their respective holders we cannot say that
one is ‘in a relation to a Supreme Being’ and the other is not.”77
From the perspective of conscientious objectors, however, the most significant
and encouraging case decided by the United States Supreme Court during the post World
War II era was Girouard v. United States (1946).78 In Girouard, the Court drew from the
intellectual arguments of both Holmes and Brandeis and issued a strong statement in
support of conscience by contending that individuals who obeyed their conscience and
refused to serve in the military were nonetheless loyal, valuable citizens. The next
chapter considers the history of Girouard and its impact.
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Chapter Four
A “Most Heart Searching Question”: The Admission of Conscientious Objectors
as Citizens of the United States
Though most of its decisions regarding conscientious objectors during the post
World War II era addressed procedural issues, the Supreme Court also spoke on one of
the most fundamental and hotly contested questions debated by the opponents and
supporters of COs: Whether individuals who refused to bear arms in defense of the
nation qualified for U.S. citizenship. The Court had first entered the debate over COs and
citizenship twenty years earlier. In a series of cases stretching back to the 1920s, the
Court initially held that applicants for citizenship must confirm their willingness to take
up arms in defense of the nation, regardless of their age, sex, or professional
qualifications.1 Those decisions were, however, far from unanimous. Like Abrams and
other decisions of the Supreme Court involving opposition to the draft and the question of
free speech, the citizenship cases generated passionate dissents in which some the Court’s
most eloquent and respected jurists advocated the protection of conscience and debated
where to strike the balance between individual liberty and defense of the nation. As in
post World War I cases involving the prosecution of individuals opposed to the draft and
in the post World War II cases concerning the procedural rules governing the
identification and classification of conscientious objectors, the views of the justices who
dissented in the first citizenship cases to reach the Court eventually prevailed. After first
agreeing that applicants expressing reservations about their willingness to bear arms on
behalf of the nation were properly denied citizenship, the Court in United States v.
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Girouard (1946) reversed its earlier rulings and held that conscientious objection to
military service did not provide an adequate basis for excluding individuals from
citizenship.2 In Girouard, the Court observed that individuals who put duty to conscience
above duty to country were nonetheless valuable, loyal citizens. As conscientious
objectors and members of the American Legion and VFW battled over whether even
native-born COs were entitled to enjoy the full benefits of U.S. citizenship, the Court said
that they were. By changing course in Girouard, the Court moved to protect the rights of
COs and demonstrated its increasing commitment to protecting some forms of
conscience.
This chapter explores the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
addressing the admission of conscientious objectors as U.S. citizens and examines how
the Court’s position on this issue evolved. It also considers how those cases related to the
debate over the protection of conscience initiated by Justices Holmes and Brandeis.
The first Supreme Court cases focusing on the qualifications of conscientious
objectors for U.S. citizenship reflected some of the same distrust and fear of COs and
their beliefs that the American Legion and VFW would express following World War II.
In United States v. Schwimmer (1929) the Court ruled that a Hungarian woman who
described herself as a committed pacifist did not qualify for citizenship because of her
beliefs.3 In the Court’s decision, Justice Pierce Butler cited the same connection between
citizenship and military service that became the cornerstone of Legion and VFW attacks
against conscientious objectors twenty years later.4 Contending that all citizens shared an
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obligation to defend the nation by force of arms, Butler wrote that: “The common defense
was one of the purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution.”5
The beliefs of conscientious objectors threatened the nation’s ability to defend itself.
Butler observed that:
Whatever tends to lessen the willingness of citizens to discharge their duty
to bear arms in the country's defense detracts from the strength and safety
of the government. And their opinions and beliefs as well as their behavior
indicating a disposition to hinder in the performance of that duty are
subjects of inquiry under the statutory provisions governing naturalization
and are of vital importance, for if all or a large number of citizens oppose
such defense the 'good order and happiness' of the United States cannot
long endure. And it is evident that the views of applicants for naturalization
in respect of such matters may not be disregarded. The influence of
conscientious objectors against the use of military force in defense of the
principles of our government is apt to be more detrimental than their mere
refusal to bear arms.6
In Butler’s opinion, the government properly denied Schwimmer’s application for
citizenship because the views of individuals like her were responsible for the wave of
opposition to conscription the nation experienced during World War I. Again expressing
his concern about what he considered the dangerous ideas of conscientious objectors,
Butler wrote that during World War I a number of citizens had been “unwilling to bear
arms in that crisis and [had] refused to obey the laws of the United States and the lawful
commands of its officers and encouraged such disobedience in others. It is obvious that
the acts of such offenders evidence a want of that attachment to the principles of the
Constitution of which the applicant is required to give affirmative evidence by the
Naturalization Act.”7 Because of her unwillingness to fight on the nation’s behalf, wrote
Butler, Schwimmer failed to qualify for citizenship. Butler’s opinion in Schwimmer
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followed the same logic that had supported the Court’s rulings in Schenk, Frohwerk,
Debs, and Abrams.8 From Butler’s perspective, Schwimmer’s views on war and
participation in the military created the same clear and present danger to the nation and
its survival as had the incendiary pamphlets and speeches of the defendants prosecuted
under the Espionage and Sedition Acts. Butler maintained that excluding individuals like
Schwimmer from U.S. citizenship was a valid means of protecting the nation from the
harm their ideas might generate.9
By the time the Supreme Court issued its decision in Schwimmer, Justice Holmes,
the architect of the clear and present danger standard, together with Justice Brandeis, was
employing that doctrine as a means of promoting free speech rather than as a justification
for punishing it. Consequently, Butler’s opinion in Schwimmer engendered a strong
dissent from Holmes, who saw no clear and present danger in admitting Schwimmer as a
citizen.10 Holmes objections to the majority’s decision in Schwimmer were in essence the
same points he had raised in his Abrams dissent ten years earlier. A champion of free
speech, Holmes believed that opposing ideas should be freely expressed so that they
could compete with each other.11 Society ultimately benefited from such an exchange,
said Holmes, as newer, better philosophies and practices identified through that process
replaced obsolete ones. As he had done in Abrams, Holmes argued that silencing
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unpopular ideas hurt the nation by limiting that debate. Holmes objected to the Court’s
ruling in Schwimmer, because he believed that the government was excluding
Schwimmer from citizenship because most Americans disagreed with her pacifist
philosophy. Refusing to admit Schwimmer because of her pacifist philosophy was, in
Holmes’s view, counterproductive and a violation of the nation’s constitutional
principles. He wrote that, “if there is any principle of the Constitution that more
imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought—not
free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate. I think
that we should adhere to that principle with regard to admission into, as well as to life
within this country.”12 In Holmes view, conscientious objectors added to the exchange of
ideas that strengthened the country. In his dissent in Schwimmer, Holmes suggested that
objectors and pacifists were valuable citizens meriting the benefits and protections of the
nation’s laws because of their dissenting ideology, not in spite of it. Holmes’s dissent in
Schwimmer marked another important entry in his work arguing for the protection of
conscience.
The Supreme Court’s initial pronouncement on the admission of pacifists as
citizens thus, in many respects, mirrored the Court’s earlier decisions concerning the
suppression of speech under the Espionage and Sedition Acts during World War I. The
majority had determined that the opposition to the war and the draft espoused by the
defendants in Schenck, Frohwerk, Debs, and Abrams justified their prosecution.
Schwimmer followed the same pattern, with the majority holding that the danger posed by
Schwimmer’s ideas warranted denial of her application for citizenship. But in Abrams
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and Schwimmer, Holmes and Brandeis broke with the majority and emphasized how
protecting claims of conscience benefitted the nation.
The debate among members of the Court over the dangers and benefits of
respecting claims of conscience arose again in United States v. Macintosh (1931). When
Douglas Macintosh, a preeminent theologian and professor at Yale Divinity School,
applied for U.S. citizenship, the petition he submitted to the federal district court required
that he answer the following question: “If necessary, are you willing to take up arms in
defense of this country?” Macintosh, who had served as an ambulance driver during
World War I answered, “Yes; but I should want to be free to judge of the necessity.”13 He
attached a memorandum to his petition in which he expanded on his answer:
I am willing to do what I judge to be in the best interests of my country,
but only in so far as I can believe that this is not going to be against the
best interests of humanity in the long run. I do not undertake to support
'my country, right or wrong' in any dispute which may arise, and I am not
willing to promise beforehand, and without knowing the cause for which
my country may go to war, either that I will or that I will not take up arms
in defense of this country, ‘however necessary’ the war may seem to be to
the Government of the day. It is only in a sense consistent with these
statements that I am willing to promise to “support and defend” the
Government of the United States 'against all enemies, foreign and
domestic.14
Deeming Macintosh unwilling to assume all obligations of citizenship because of his
equivocal answer about bearing arms, the district court denied his application.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, citing the Court’s ruling
in United States v. Schwimmer. Writing for the Majority, Justice George Sutherland
observed that, “we are a nation with the duty to survive; a nation whose Constitution
contemplates war as well as peace; whose government must go forward upon the
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assumption, and safely can proceed upon no other, that unqualified allegiance to the
nation and submission and obedience to the laws of the land, as well those made for war
as those made for peace, are not inconsistent with the will of God.”15 Macintosh, said
Sutherland, “speaks of putting his allegiance to the will of God above his allegiance to
the government, it is evident, in the light of his entire statement, that he means to make
his own interpretation of the will of God the decisive test which shall conclude the
government and stay its hand.”16 Because Macintosh insisted on reserving the right to
place his conscience above obligations to his country, the Court ruled that he did not
qualify for citizenship.
Four justices, Brandeis, Holmes, Hughes, and Stone, dissented in Macintosh.
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote for them. Hughes argued that it was
unrealistic to require applicants to swear that they will put obligations to their country
before obligations to their conscience. Such a requirement would trouble many
Americans, observed Hughes. He wrote that, “while it has always been recognized that
the supreme power of government may be exerted and disobedience to its commands
may be punished, we know that with many of our worthy citizens it would be a most
heart-searching question if they were asked whether they would promise to obey a law
believed to be in conflict with religious duty. Many of their most honored exemplars in
the past have been willing to suffer imprisonment or even death rather than to make such
a promise.”17 Citizens of the United States, argued Hughes, shared a legacy of
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accommodating claims of conscience, and they had done so, he noted, with minimal
impact on law and order. He argued that:
There is abundant room for enforcing the requisite authority of law as it is
enacted and requires obedience, and for maintaining the conception of the
supremacy of law as essential to orderly government, without demanding
that either citizens or applicants for citizenship shall assume by oath an
obligation to regard allegiance to God as subordinate to allegiance to civil
power. The attempt to exact such a promise, and thus to bind one's
conscience by the taking of oaths or the submission to tests, has been the
cause of many deplorable conflicts. The Congress has sought to avoid
such conflicts in this country by respecting our happy tradition. In no
sphere of legislation has the intention to prevent such clashes been more
conspicuous than in relation to the bearing of arms.18
As Justice Brandeis had done in Gilbert v. Minnesota, Hughes in his dissent in
Macintosh emphasized the value to the individual of recognizing claims of conscience.
Forcing individuals to subordinate their beliefs to the needs of the state generated, in
Hughes view, unnecessary conflict and should be avoided if possible. He portrayed the
right to follow one’s own beliefs and place those beliefs above all other obligations as
one of American’s most cherished rights. Hughes also pointed out the various ways
conscientious objectors served the nation in noncombatant roles during wartime. He
wrote that “we have but to consider the defense given to our country in the late war, both
in industry and in the field, by workers of all sorts, by engineers, nurses, doctors and
chaplains, to realize that there is opportunity even at such a time for essential service in
the activities of defense which do not require the overriding of such religious scruples.”19
In his dissent in Macintosh, Hughes argued that individuals who placed duty to
conscience above duty to country were nonetheless valuable, loyal citizens.
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The Court’s decision in Macintosh and the dissent authored by Hughes
highlighted the chasm between those justices who maintained that Congress had validly
conditioned admission to citizenship on an individual’s willingness to render military
service—even if serving in the military required that he disregard his conscience—and
the dissenters who saw the realm of conscience as insulated from intrusion by the
government. Hughes’s dissent in Macintosh rested on the argument Brandeis had
developed in his dissent to the Court’s ruling in Gilbert v. Minnesota. Arguing for broad
judicial recognition and protection of conscience, Brandeis had maintained in Gilbert that
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the government from prosecuting certain personal
beliefs, such as opposition to war or conscription. Hughes went one step further. Not
only was it improper for the government to interfere with claims of conscience, it was
also impractical to do so. When it came to certain crucial issues, such as if one would
fight and kill, some individuals would invariably place duty to conscience above duty to
country if forced to make such a “heart-searching decision.”20 Hughes expanded the
discussion by contending that those individuals who insisted on following their
consciences remained loyal citizens.
In addition to his rhetoric about the importance of not forcing individuals to
choose country over conscience, the dissent Justice Hughes wrote in Macintosh made
another important contribution to the discussion over granting citizenship to pacifists and
conscientious objectors. Hughes maintained that the issue presented a technical question
of statutory interpretation in addition to philosophical ones about the protection of
conscience. He asserted that the key issue was whether or not Congress had mandated
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that all applicants for citizenship express a willingness to bear arms. Hughes pointed out
that the statute mandated only that the applicant pledge that he “will support and defend
the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic,
and bear true faith and allegiance to the same.”21 Congress had not included, said Hughes,
an express requirement that the applicant agree to serve in the military.22 Given the
nation’s long history of accommodating claims of conscience, Hughes argued that the
Court should not interpret the statute as including such a requirement.23 The approach
advocated by Hughes in his dissent in Macintosh anticipated the course the Court would
later follow in the post World War II cases addressing the procedural rights and
protections of conscientious objectors. Instead of entering the debate over who should
and who should not be classified as a conscientious objector, the Court in those later
cases read the conscription statute as requiring that a minimum level of due process
compliance, including judicial oversight applied to all draft board hearings. By focusing
on technical requirements governing administrative actions, the justices eventually
extended the protection of COs without resolving difficult substantive questions, such as
whether individuals objecting solely on secular grounds should be excused from military
service. Hughes’s dissent in Macintosh, in which he contended that the immigration law
did not exclude COs from citizenship, eventually produced a similar result in the
citizenship cases, as it provided a technical argument supporting the admission of
pacifists and conscientious objectors that did not require that the Court also resolve the
more difficult philosophical questions surrounding the issue.

21	
  Ibid.,	
  630.	
  
22	
  Ibid.,	
  630-‐31.	
  
23	
  Ibid.	
  

112

The argument Hughes developed in his dissent to the Court’s ruling in Macintosh
prevailed when the Supreme Court revisited the issue of citizenship for conscientious
objectors following the end of World War II. In Girouard v. United States (1946). The
Court reversed its previous decisions in Schwimmer, Macintosh, and Bland, this time
holding that conscientious objectors qualified for U.S. citizenship.24 Girouard was a
Seventh-day Adventist and a conscientious objector. Writing for the Court, Justice
William Douglas followed the path Chief Justice Hughes had laid out in his dissent in
Macintosh. Douglas began by finding that the oath taken by applicants for citizenship
included no language expressly requiring the individual to bear arms in the nation’s
defense.25 After disposing of that technical point, Douglas proceeded to address some of
the concern and suspicion surrounding conscientious objectors and their role as citizens.
Referring to Girouard’s willingness to serve in noncombatant roles, Douglas wrote that,
“The bearing of arms, important as it is, is not the only way in which our institutions may
be supported and defended, even in times of great peril. Total war in its modern form
dramatizes as never before the great cooperative effort necessary for victory.”26 Douglas
continued: “The struggle for religious liberty has, through the centuries, been an effort to
accommodate the demands of the State to the conscience of the individual. The victory
for freedom of thought recorded in our Bill of Rights recognizes that, in the domain of
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conscience, there is a moral power higher than the State. Throughout the ages, men have
suffered death rather than subordinate their allegiance to God to the authority of the State.
Freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment is the product of that struggle.”27
With those words, the Girouard opinion removed the bar to citizenship imposed
on alien objectors and pacifists. Perhaps even more important, the Court recognized that
individuals could place allegiance to conscience above duty to their country and still be
loyal citizens. Douglas recognized the contribution of many objectors to the nation’s
welfare and thereby legitimized their claims to citizenship. His logic extended beyond
alien objectors and pacifists applying for citizenship to encompass American COs treated
as second-class citizens. Douglas’ opinion provided a basis for conscientious objectors to
claim all the benefits and protections of U.S citizenship.28
Conscientious objectors and their supporters rejoiced. The Advent Review and
Sabbath Herald, wrote: “We can thank God anew that those of us who live in America
are protected by the provisions of a written Constitution, and that its guarantees are
sacredly guarded by men on our highest tribunal who are anxious apparently to recognize
that one's conscientious convictions and devotion to God, while they may prevent him
from participating in some activities of the Government, do not in any degree indicate
disloyalty or unwillingness to serve.”29
Opponents of conscientious objectors felt differently. The Girouard decision
angered the Legion and the VFW by severing the connection between citizenship and
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military service that those organizations held dear. The Legion, for example, had lobbied
against legislation to admit Macintosh as a citizen that was introduced in Congress after
the Supreme Court ruled against him.30 The veterans’ organizations, however, were not
the only ones bothered by the Court’s ruling. Reflecting anxiety about the possibility that
another war might soon follow the last one, the American Bar Association worried that
the Court might have undermined the ability of Congress to defend the nation. The
Court, according to the ABA, had raised doubts about a premise of modern society—that
government can force all citizens to take up arms to defend the nation. The ABA
questioned the sincerity and patriotism of objectors and echoed traditional stereotypes
about them. The ABA quoted a source in the Selective Service Administration who said
of COs that, “There was something soft, effeminate, or furtive about many of them. They
were frequently referred to by others as ‘yellow’.” The ABA promoted the same link
between citizenship and military service as did the Legion and VFW. “An alien who asks
the favor of citizenship and at the same time demands that he be exempt from the kind of
service that was necessary to establish our form of government and may at any time be
necessary to maintain it, and who shows a want of respect for such an obligation of
citizenship, is hardly worthy of our regard.”31 Critics of the Girouard decision
introduced legislation to reverse the Court’s ruling by amending the Naturalization
Law.32 The bill failed, and the Court’s decision in favor of conscientious objectors stood.
Girouard signified an important evolution in the Court’s view of conscientious
objectors. In Girouard, the Court abandoned its initial suspicion of COs and their
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motives. The views of Holmes in support of ideas and their expression triumphed in
Girouard, as Douglas’s opinion asserted that conscientious objectors served the nation
despite their pacifist ideals. The case was also a victory for the views of Brandeis, in that
it demonstrated the Court’s increasing recognition of the important role conscience
played in the lives of American citizens. The tolerance for claims of conscience
expressed by the Court in Girouard gave Gara and his supporters reason for optimism
that his conviction would be reversed on appeal, but those hopes were dashed by the cold
reception Gara’s case received in the United States District Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit and by a deadlock among the Justices on the Supreme Court.
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Chapter Five
The Gara Case and Freedom of Conscience

The Gara case arose amidst the legal and social turmoil concerning conscientious
objectors and their status as American citizens that intensified during World War II and
continued after its end. Fear that the ideas espoused by pacifists and COs undermined the
nation’s security intensified, as the United States soon found itself embroiled in the Cold
War and then the conflict in Korea. Objectors were not without supporters, as the reaction
to the firings in Virginia and the public support for releasing COs from jail demonstrated.
Congress and state governments had not adopted the more draconian recommendations of
the Legion and the VFW; they did not ban COs from public employment or from
receiving public assistance. Nonetheless, conscientious objectors remained a small,
marginalized group. For adhering to their beliefs, some lost jobs and others their freedom.
The nation remained skeptical of their loyalty, as the Cold War expanded in scope and
the country searched for enemies at home as well as abroad.
The Gara case posed a new danger to the rights of conscientious objectors and to
all Americans concerned about protection of belief and expression—the threat that the
government could prosecute conscientious objectors for encouraging each other to adhere
to their principles. Rickert had decided not to register for the draft and had even traveled
to his local draft board and informed the officials there of his decision before he met Gara
for the first time. Rickert had already ignored the statutory mandate that he register by a
specific date before Gara, in the presence of the federal officers who came to arrest
Rickert, advised Rickert to stand by his principles and not allow the officers to coerce
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him into registering. If the government could prosecute Gara for telling Rickert not to
abandon his beliefs, what remained of the First Amendment’s protection of conscience?
Conscientious objectors viewed the prosecution of Gara as a new attack on their most
important and fundamental civil liberties—their rights of speech and conscience.
Though the district court had convicted Gara and sentenced him to eighteen
months in prison for aiding and abetting violation of the conscription statute, Gara and
his supporters had reason to hope that his conviction would be overturned on appeal. The
Supreme Court had expressed strong support for the protection of the rights of
conscientious objectors in the Girouard decision. In addition to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Girouard, other judicial trends also gave Gara and his supporters reasons for
optimism.
Gara and his lawyers were encouraged by the increasing vigor of the law
governing the protection of speech under the First Amendment. The rigorous application
of the clear and present danger rule espoused by Brandeis and Holmes eventually had
become the majority rule of the Court.1 While Gara waited for his appeal to be heard, the
Supreme Court decided Terminiello v. Chicago (1949).2 Terminiello, a defrocked
Catholic priest, had delivered a controversial speech on behalf of The Christian Veterans
of America. During his speech, Terminiello verbally attacked political leaders and racial
minorities. His remarks generated a number of skirmishes in the large crowd assembled
outside the hall where he spoke. Terminiello’s inflammatory rhetoric led to his arrest and
prosecution for disorderly conduct. At his trial, the court instructed the jury that speech
breaches the peace and thereby violates the law “if it stirs the public to anger, invites
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dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it molests the
inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm."3 Satisfied that
Terminiello’s speech met that standard, the jury found him guilty. The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction because of the jury instructions. Justice William O. Douglas
wrote the opinion for the Court. In it, he explained that the judge’s instruction
improperly allowed the jury to convict Terminiello for merely creating a disturbance that
fell short of a clear and present danger to public safety. Douglas wrote that, “speech is
often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and
have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why
freedom of speech, though not absolute, [citations omitted] is nevertheless protected
against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present
danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance,
or unrest.”4
The jury instructions in the Gara trial suffered from the same infirmity as the
instructions in Terminiello. As happened in Terminiello, the trial judge in the Gara case
misinterpreted the law and failed to apply the clear and present danger test. During
Gara’s trial, the judge told the jury that “the real question is whether the words used by
Gara were knowingly used in such circumstances and were of such a nature as that they
would have a tendency to cause a refusal of duty as required by the [conscription] act.”5
The courts had frequently applied this “bad tendency” test before it was overruled and
replaced by Holmes’ formulation of the clear and present danger standard. Legal
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commentators described the difference between the “bad tendency” and the “clear and
present danger” test as “whether the state can punish words which have some tendency,
however remote, to bring about acts in violation of law, or only words which directly
incite to acts in violation of law.”6 Gara’s lawyers pointed out this discrepancy in their
appellate briefs, arguing that the trial court should have followed the rigorous standards
protecting free speech established in Terminiello.7 They also stressed that Gara first meet
Rickert after September 10, 1949, the day on which Rickert went to the local draft board
and informed them of his decision not to register. Since Rickert did not even know Gara
when Rickert violated the conscription law, Gara, said his lawyers, could not be guilty of
counseling, aiding and abetting Rickert’s actions.
Despite the apparent strength of his legal arguments, Gara’s appeals proved
unsuccessful. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the regulations
implementing the Selective Service Act made the obligation to register a continuous one.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that Rickert remained obligated to register
when the FBI arrived to arrest him and that Gara therefore violated the statutory
prohibition against aiding and abetting by encouraging Rickert to follow his conscience
instead.8 The Court of Appeals also found no fault with the jury instructions and the lack
of analysis by the trial court concerning clear and present danger. The Court of Appeals
held that:
On the question whether a clear and present danger existed, requiring the
enactment of the statute, the Congress is the judge. It has the obligation,
under the Federal Constitution, of providing for the common defense. In the
6	
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preamble to the Selective Service Act of 1948, under the congressional
declaration of policy it is stated ‘The Congress declares that an adequate
armed strength must be achieved and maintained to insure the security of this
Nation.’ We take judicial notice of the existence of the so-called ‘Cold War’
which in the view of the Congress necessitated this peacetime draft.9
The Court of Appeals conducted no independent analysis to determine if Gara’s words
actually created any imminent threat or danger or if they produced any result at all since
Rickert had decided not to register well before Gara had spoken his words of
encouragement.
After the Court of Appeals issued its decision, Gara petitioned the United States
Supreme Court to hear his case. The Supreme Court agreed to do so. Justice Clark, who
had been serving as the United States Attorney General when Gara was arrested, recused
himself. The remaining eight justices split evenly—four voting to uphold Gara’s
conviction and four voting to overturn it. According to court rules, in the absence of
consensus existed among the participating Justices, the judgment was affirmed. The
Supreme Court issued no written opinion in the case.10
Why was Gara convicted and why were his appeals unsuccessful? The record and
chronology of the case offer a few insights. As noted above, the trial court reverted to the
antiquated and discredited “bad tendency” test when instructing the jury as to the findings
of fact required to convict Gara of aiding and abetting Rickert’s violation of the draft law.
The “bad tendency” test allowed the jury to convict Gara if it found that his words and
actions might cause others to disobey the law. The bad tendency test was far less
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protective of speech and conscience than the clear and present danger criteria. For that
reason, the “clear and present danger” standard had replaced the “bad tendency” test
thirty years before the Gara case, when Justice Holmes began to define the limits of free
speech and the protection of conscience in Schenck and Abrams.11 The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit compounded the error. The court of appeals ignored the trial court’s
improper instruction to the jury, and while ostensibly applying the clear and present
danger standard, it did so in an odd way. The court of appeals recognized the
Congressional determination that the Cold War created a state of emergency justifying
adoption of the Selective Service Act. The court then used that same determination to
uphold the conviction of Gara for encouraging Rickert to disobey that law. The court of
appeals failed to determine independently whether or not Gara’s actions created a clear
and present danger. That was a crucial question in the case, especially since Gara had not
spoken with Rickert until after Rickert had already violated the conscription law. The
court of appeals might have found that Gara’s words of encouragement to Rickert created
no clear and present danger under those circumstances and that his speech therefore was
protected by the First Amendment. Instead, the court of appeals seized on a regulation of
the Selective Service stating that the duty to register was a continuing one that Gara
encouraged Rickert to violate. By doing so, the Court of Appeals characterized Gara’s
speech as incitement of a sequence of reoccurring illegal actions, not as moral support for
a comrade about to suffer the consequences of following his conscience. The court of
appeals appeared to have been far more concerned with supporting the efforts of
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Congress to protect the nation against the dangers of the Cold War than with protecting
acts of conscience.
In their application to the Supreme Court, Gara's counsel vociferously objected to
the court of appeals upholding the conviction based on Rickert's continuing violation of
the conscription statute. Gara's lawyers argued that the government had charged him
with aiding Rickert's failure to register by the September 10, deadline. His conviction
was now being upheld on a different basis—that Rickert's violation continued indefinitely
and that Gara therefore aided in the commission of a continuing felony. According to
Gara's lawyers, this discrepancy between the charges against Gara and the basis of his
conviction violated his due process rights. Since the Supreme Court deadlocked and
therefore disposed of the case without issuing a written opinion, the unique legal issues
and complexities embedded in the court of appeals ruling that Gara had aided a
continuing violation of the law were not explored further. The Supreme Court did,
however, eventually discredit the interpretation of the Selective Service regulations
adopted by the court of appeals in Gara. In a Vietnam era case, Toussie v. United States
(1970), the Court held that the obligation of young men to register for military service
pursuant to the conscription statute was not a continuing one for purposes of applying the
statute of limitations. Toussie failed to register within one year of his eighteenth birthday
as mandated by the draft law. Eight years later, the government arrested and prosecuted
him for draft evasion. Though a five year statute of limitations normally would have
required dismissal of the charges, the government argued that Toussie’s violation of the
draft law was a continuing one to which the statute of limitations did not apply. The
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Toussie broke the law when he first failed to
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register and that the statute of limitations ran from that date, thereby foreclosing the
prosecution of Toussie eight years later. The Court concluded that the obligation to
register for the draft should not be viewed as a continuing obligation in order expand the
criminal liability of individuals charged with violating the conscription statute.12
As for the reaction of the Supreme Court to the Gara case, the Terminiello
decision may have overstated its commitment to the protection of speech at the time of
Gara’s appeal. Shortly after reaching a deadlock in Gara, the Court decided Feiner v.
New York (1951).13 The facts in Feiner paralleled those in Terminiello, except for one
crucial point: Feiner was a communist, not a facist. Speaking on a Syracuse street corner,
Feiner addressed a racially mixed crowd of blacks and whites. The main purpose of his
speech was to promote a local meeting of the Progressive League, but during his speech,
Feiner also insulted and criticized President Truman, the mayor of Syracuse and the
police department. Noting the lack of civil rights afforded to blacks, Feiner encouraged
blacks to rise up and forcefully seize those rights. The police arrived, and one member of
the audience told them that he intended to take Feiner down from his soap box if the
police did not. Apparently concerned about a potential outbreak of violence, the officers
told Feiner to end his speech. When he refused to do so, they arrested him. Feiner was
tried and convicted of breaching the peace.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Feiner. Chief Justice Fred Vinson
wrote the opinion. Vinson and three other Justices had dissented in Terminiello. The
dissenters contended that Terminiello had waived his right to complain about the jury
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instructions by failing to raise any objection to them during his trial.14 The decision
penned by Vinson in Feiner suggests a changing perspective on the Court towards speech
and the protection of conscience. Vinson observed that the trial judge in Feiner had
listened to the officers’ testimony and then determined that Feiner’s speech created a
clear and present danger of violence erupting in the crowd.15 The police did not arrive
with the intention of silencing Feiner, said Vinson, and had directed him to stop only
when the crowd began to stir.16 Vinson concluded by noting that the Court would not
interfere with legitimate police actions designed to preserve public safety.17
The Court’s decision in Feiner elicited strong dissents from Justices Black and
Douglas. Both argued that the police should have protected Feiner from members of the
crowd threatening to harm him and thereby protected his right to speak. Black and
Douglas worried that by upholding the conviction of Feiner the Court had created a
heckler’s veto allowing anyone who disagreed with a speaker to silence him by becoming
disorderly.18 But in 1949 death had robbed Black and Douglas of two of their crucial
allies on the Court regarding civil liberties, Justices Murphy and Rutledge, both staunch
supporters of the preferred freedoms doctrine. Without them, Black and Douglas could
not generate in Feiner the support for the freedom of speech and protection of conscience
they had mustered in Terminiello. The limited focus of Douglas’s opinion in Terminiello
also impacted Feiner’s appeal. Douglas had addressed only the defective instructions
given to the jury that convicted Terminiello. He had not attempted to construct a broader
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argument justifying the expression of unpopular ideas or questioning the legitimacy of
punishing speech that stirs strong dissent. That allowed Vinson to distinguish Feiner
from Terminiello and, in the absence of an improper charge to the jury, to uphold the
conviction of Feiner based on the public interest in maintaining order.19 There was
another important difference as well between Feiner and Terminiello. As a fascist,
Terminiello represented a political movement that the United States had recently defeated
and that no longer posed a credible threat to the nation’s security. Feiner, a communist,
espoused an ideology that currently challenged America’s interests around the globe, and
its adherents were waging a hot war with the United States and its allies in Korea. Under
those circumstances the Court could have easily viewed the ideas and words of the
communist Feiner, and not those of the fascist Terminiello, as posing a clear and present
danger.
Justices Black and Douglas saw Feiner as a step backwards in the protection of
speech and conscience. Other champions of First Amendment rights saw the result in
Gara the same way. Robert F. Drinan, a lawyer and a professor at Weston College,
commented about the Gara decision shortly after the Supreme Court’s order brought the
matter to an end. He criticized the obvious shortcomings in the reasoning of both the trial
court and the court of appeals in Gara. Both had ignored or misconstrued the law
governing the freedom of speech, he said, and the Supreme Court should have reversed
their rulings. The case centered, in Drinan’s view, on the protection of conscience.
Drinan saw the Girouard decision as progress and credited the Court for recognizing that
individuals who place duty to conscience above duty to country were also loyal citizens.
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The Court’s concern in Girouard for the protection of conscience made the Gara case
even more disappointing than it otherwise would have been. Drinan wrote that, “the
Gara decision, it seems to this observer, is an unfortunate backward step in the Court’s
forward march to grant that complete liberty of conscience to all which is not inconsistent
with the common good.”20
The Gara decision represented, as Drinan observed, a retreat from the protection
of conscience. Rather than apply the more robust standards of the clear and present
danger test to determine if Gara’s encouragement of Rickert created any imminent peril,
the courts merely deferred to the decision of Congress that speech against the draft in
general endangers the nation and should be suppressed. In that sense, the government’s
prosecution of Larry Gara resembled the World War I speech cases that led to the
conviction of individuals who posed little or no real threat to the Selective Service
system. In both cases, wartime fears triumphed over the protection of conscience. By the
time Gara’s appeal reached the Supreme Court, Americans were again fighting and dying
in Korea and fear of communism gripped the nation.
The Gara case also demonstrated the extent to which conscientious objectors were
excluded from the benefits of American citizenship in the aftermath of World War II.
For following their consciences, they forfeited job and financial security, as veterans’
organizations lobbied to deny them those privileges. The Gara case reminded COs that
their civil liberties were imperiled as well. The decision indicated that they might be
imprisoned for encouraging each other to remain true to their convictions or for any
statements that might be construed as interfering with conscription. Frequently viewed as
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disloyal for rejecting the link between military service and citizenship, conscientious
objectors remained a powerless minority group treated as second-class citizens. The
rulings in Gara left them even more vulnerable. Formulating his argument in favor of
free speech, Justice Brandeis had referred to the freedom of expression and conscience as
inherent privileges of all American citizens. Those rights sheltered even the incendiary
speech of the pugnacious Terminiello from prosecution. The Gara decision, however,
warned conscientious objectors that the protection of speech and other benefits of
citizenship extended even to hate mongers like Terminiello may not apply to them. From
the trial court to the Supreme Court, the judiciary had refused to extend to Gara the broad
protections of speech and conscience afforded other defendants. Perhaps, as Minister
Harrington had observed from his pulpit in New York after first learning of Gara’s arrest
and conviction, the courts and powerful opponents of conscientious objectors did
consider them more dangerous than traitors and murderers.
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Conclusion
Claims of Conscience and the Supreme Court in the Post World War II Era
The prosecution and conviction of Larry Gara illustrated the precarious position
claims of conscience occupied in American Society in the years immediately after World
War II. The trial court and the court of appeals both saw Gara as a purveyor of
dangerous ideas capable of hampering the nation’s ability to protect itself against the
Soviet threat. Much of American society viewed conscientious objectors the same way,
maintaining that COs had broken a fundamental principle of citizenship—that an
individual owes military service to the nation in return for the benefits and protections the
state provides. As groups like the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion
lobbied to remove conscientious objectors from public jobs and to deny them any form of
public assistance, those groups maintained that COs were not entitled to enjoy the full
benefits of citizenship because of their refusal to fight. They also asserted that children
and other impressionable individuals must be shielded from the harmful philosophy
spread by conscientious objectors and pacifists. The status of conscientious objectors
during the post World War II era disclosed the nation’s ambivalence over the expression
and protection of beliefs contrary to those of the majority. To many, minority views,
such as the refusal to bear arms, seemed anti-democratic and threatened the nation’s
existence.
The Gara case demonstrated the difficulty of reconciling the protection of civil
liberties and freedom of conscience with the operation and protection of a modern
democratic society. The arrest and conviction of Gara raised questions that extended far
beyond the small group of conscientious objectors who, like Larry Gara, refused to bear
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arms in defense of the nation and created doubts about the extent to which all Americans
were entitled to believe and say what they wished. Was it true, as the supporters of Gara
charged, that in the United States, with its constitutional protection of speech and ideas,
encouraging someone to follow the dictates of his conscience was illegal? That question
must have bothered the District Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, because it
specifically addressed it in the court’s opinion upholding the conviction of Gara. Gara,
said the Court, was free to believe and say what he wished. He could speak against the
draft and urge its repeal. What the law prohibited, however, and where, in the court’s
estimation, Gara crossed the line between protected speech and an illegal act, was
encouraging others to disobey the Selective Service Act of 1948 by not registering for the
draft. According to the court of appeals, the government was not punishing Gara for
following his conscience or for speaking his mind about conscription. The case was not
about free speech, said the court of appeals; it was about Gara committing an illegal act
when he told Rickert to follow his conscience and not to allow anyone to coerce him into
registering.1
The United States Supreme Court had struggled with how to define the difference
between the First Amendment freedoms of thought and expression and illegal behavior
long before the prosecution of Larry Gara. If the Gara case had arisen thirty years earlier,
Justices Holmes and Brandeis might have commented that distinguishing between
protected speech and unlawful incitement was not as simple as the court of appeals
claimed. Holmes had struggled with the same issue. In Debs v. United States (1919),
socialist leader Eugene V. Debs had delivered a series of speeches in which he opposed
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U.S. involvement in World War I and spoke admiringly of men and women opposed to
the draft. Debs never directly suggested that his listeners disobey the conscription laws.
Despite Debs’s circumspection, the Supreme Court upheld his conviction for violating
the Espionage Act of 1917. Justice Holmes wrote the opinion for the Court. Even though
Debs never expressly advocated disobedience of the law or interference with the war
effort, Holmes construed Debs’s praise for dissidents and opposition to the war as
designed to encourage opposition to the draft and insurrection in the military.2 Holmes
held that the prosecution of Debs did not violate his rights under the First Amendment
because Debs’s words and the examples he cited suggested that he intended to encourage
resistance to conscription and opposition to the war effort.
The Supreme Court decided Debs before Abrams, where Holmes in his famous
dissent injected life and vigor into the clear and present danger test and deployed it as a
tool for the protection of thought and speech. Holmes changed direction in Abrams to
correct the deficiencies and inconsistencies he recognized in his opinion upholding the
conviction of Debs. As Holmes noted in Gitlow, all speech is an incitement designed to
change minds and spur others into action.3 For Holmes, the question became whether the
speech and ideas at issue were likely to cause immediate turmoil and revolt threatening
public safety and welfare. Only then could speech be suppressed. That was the essence
of the clear and present danger rule. The pamphlets distributed by the defendants in
Abrams and Gitlow called more directly for revolution than anything Debs told his
audiences. But Holmes considered those flyers innocuous, contending that they were
unlikely to generate a significant following or threat to public order. The defendants in
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Abrams and Gitlow should have been exonerated, said Holmes, because their words and
beliefs created no clear and present danger.4 Those two cases demonstrated a strong shift
by Holmes in favor of the protection of conscience.
Gara represented a step backwards in the protection of conscience because the
Court of Appeals ignored Holmes’s admonition in Gitlow that the expression of any idea
is an incitement. Would the court of appeals have reached a different result if Gara had
told Rickert only that Gara opposed the draft? Such a statement might easily have been
interpreted as a suggestion to Rickert that he not register. Since the court of appeals
could have viewed any positive statement by Gara relating to Rickert’s actions as
intended to strengthen Rickert’s resolve, the distinction made by the court of appeals
between protected opinions and prohibited calls for disobedience of the law was at best a
troublesome one to apply. The court should have followed Holmes’s lead and asked
whether Gara’s words of encouragement to Rickert created a clear and present danger.
Opinions on that question might have varied, but, as Holmes had learned, the clear and
present danger test provided a more appropriate and predictable means of striking the
balance between claims of conscience and the legitimate exercise of state power. Holmes
had come to realize that allowing the government to punish speech exhibiting only a
tendency to incite or encourage disobedience or unrest eviscerated the protections of
speech and conscience embodied in the First Amendment.
The cases involving COs decided by the Supreme Court following World War II
reflected how some the nation’s most articulate jurists attempted to reconcile claims of
conscience with the operation of a modern, democratic state. The discussion among the
Supreme Court Justices on why and to what extent claims of conscience merited
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protection began following World War I. Though individual justices, such as Holmes;
Brandeis; Frankfurter; Douglas; and Murphy, wrote eloquently on why claims of
conscience mattered and benefitted the nation as well as individuals, the debate produced
no consensus how such claims should be evaluated and the extent to which they should
be accommodated. The preferred freedoms doctrine might have provided such a
consensus and an ideological underpinning capable of guiding the Court in all cases
involving conscience and other First Amendment issues, but that doctrine no longer had
sufficient support on the Court following the deaths of Justices Murphy and Rutledge.
Their passing left the surviving proponents of the preferred freedoms doctrine to cobble
together an agreement with Justice Frankfurter, the Court’s leading supporter of judicial
restraint, on procedural rules concerning the due process rights of COs. This alliance
exhibited a new trend on the Court, one less concerned with ideology than with the
results achieved by judicial imposition of procedural rules like those implemented by the
Court in the post World War II Selective Service cases. Decisions like Estep and
Dickenson increased judicial protection for claims of conscience by insuring that
proceedings of draft boards comply with basic standards of due process. But those cases
reached no conclusion and offered little guidance on the overarching questions of why
the protection of conscience mattered and where the boundaries lay between conscience
and government authority.
The Gara case disclosed the inadequacy of and danger hidden in the Court’s
reliance on procedural details for the protection of civil liberties. Safeguards created by
procedural rules could later be reduced simply by changing the rules or eliminating them.
In Gara’s case, the procedural rules the Court fashioned in the post World War II
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Selective Service cases were irrelevant, because Gara was not subject to the draft or
classification process. His case could not be disposed of by interpreting statutes or by
imposing rules that draft boards must follow. His case required application of the
principles governing the freedoms of speech and conscience that Holmes, Brandeis, and
Frankfurter wrestled with after World War I. The Court needed to answer the basic
question posed about the Gara case by the Christian Century: Was it illegal to encourage
a young man like Rickert to follow his conscience? That issue impacted the civil rights
of all Americans. But the Supreme Court failed to provide an answer. Instead, the Court
deadlocked, and Gara’s conviction was sustained without further comment.
The demise of the preferred freedoms coalition left the Court without a clear
voice on where and how it would strike a balance between claims of conscience and
national security. The Court in Girouard had issued a passionate statement in support of
pacifists and COs. The Court had also voiced strong support for the expression of ideas,
even repugnant ones, in Terminiello. By then, the United States had defeated Fascism,
and so the Court could more easily find that the propaganda spewed by Terminiello
created little danger beyond the anger and hurt feelings experienced by some of his
listeners. But, in contrast, the decision in Feiner suggested that the Court harbored little
patience or tolerance for Communist ideology that seemed at the time to pose a legitimate
threat to the nation’s survival.
The post World War II cases involving COs showed how the line between the
protection of conscience and the pursuit of legitimate government interests could shift
and was subject to constant reappraisal and adjustment. Those changes occurred as
perceived dangers arose and subsided. The World War I era cases, where Holmes and

134

Brandeis first challenged the wisdom and legitimacy of suppressing unpopular ideas,
arose from attempts by the government to eradicate opposition to conscription and the
war effort. With Germany defeated, the Court turned its attention to bolstering its
protection of the civil liberties sacrificed during the war. In a similar manner, the Court
enhanced the civil liberties of COs after World War II by implementing the judicial
review procedures and due process requirements outlined in Estep and in Dickenson. The
Gara case, on the other hand, formed part of a swing away from the enhancement of civil
liberties in favor of national security as concerns about the loyalty of COs and the threat
posed by their beliefs increased following the outbreak of the Korean War. The result in
Gara also indicated that the Court had, due to changes in its composition, grown less
concerned with the protection of conscience and more sympathetic to interests of national
security.
With time, conscientious objectors and their supporters could see, as Robert
Drinan hoped they might, that the Gara case represented no more than a temporary step
backwards in the Court’s effort to extend greater protection for claims of conscience.
The importance of individual claims of conscience had already triumphed in the
Girouard case, where, writing for the Court, Justice Douglas refuted the widely-held
belief that individuals who placed duty to conscience before duty to country were
disloyal and not deserving of the benefits of U.S. citizenship. COs could also take some
comfort from the numerous rulings issued by the Court concerning procedures followed
by the Selective Service when identifying and classifying objectors. Continuing the
dialogue that began with Holmes and Brandeis following World War II, those decisions
included passionate language in support of claims of conscience and established that COs
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must be afforded due process of law. The Court’s role as the protector of conscience
continued to grow. In subsequent cases the Court would decide who did and who did not
qualify as a conscientious objector.
Though military conscription ended more than forty years ago, the tension
between fulfillment of national goals and the protection of individual conscience remains.
Photographers and florists who contend that same-sex marriage violates their religious
convictions refuse to render their services for celebrations of those unions, and antivaccination groups question the authority of the state to forcibly inoculate their children.
Like conscientious objection to military service, these cases often involve attempts by a
small, dedicated group of individuals to exclude themselves from activities generally
approved by a majority of the nation’s citizens. Whatever the cause, COs generally find
themselves opposing the wishes of their fellow citizens and thereby challenging the
legitimacy of democratic action.
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. The case involved
three closely-held for-profit corporations that objected to the requirement created by the
Affordable Care Act of 2010 that the medical insurance provided to their female
employees include coverage for certain contraceptive procedures. The shareholders of
the three entities claimed that providing access to the “Morning After Pill” and similar
contraceptive measures violated their religious principles and that the Religious
Freedoms Restoration Act therefore exempted them from complying with the mandate of
the Affordable Care Act. A sharply divided Court agreed, holding that the religious
scruples of the shareholders of a closely-held corporation excused the entity from
providing coverage for contraceptive services. As with all claims of conscience, the
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decision generated substantial controversy and strong dissents. In her dissenting opinion,
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that the decision created an easy way for individuals
asserting claims of conscience to frustrate the government’s interest in providing health
care for all of its citizens.5
****
Larry Gara’s sentence had expired by the time the Supreme Court heard his case,
and he had been released from prison. He was not the last individual the U.S. government
prosecuted for encouraging others to follow their consciences. In 1968, as opposition to
the Vietnam War grew, the government charged Dr. Benjamin Spock and three others
with aiding and abetting violations of the Selective Service Act. The jury convicted
Spock, an ardent opponent of the draft and a public critic of the Vietnam War, and the
court sentenced him to two years in jail.6
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